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Abstract
Technological advancements such as Geospatial Information Systems (GIS) and
the Internet have made it easier and affordable to share information, which enables
complex and time sensitive decisions to be made with higher confidence. Further,
advancements in information technology have dramatically increased the ability to store,
manage, integrate, and correlate larger amounts of data to improve operational
efficiency. However, the same technologies that enable increased productivity also
provide increased capabilities to those wishing to do harm.
Today’s military leaders are faced with the challenge of deciding how to make
geospatial information collected on military installations and organizations available to
authorized communities of interest while simultaneously restricting access to protect
operational security. Often, these decisions are made without understanding how the
sharing of certain combinations of data may pose a significant risk to protecting critical
information, infrastructure or resources. Information security has been an area of
growing concern in the GeoBase community since, by definition, it is required to strike a
balance between competing interests, each supported by federal policy: (1) the
availability of data paid for by tax dollars and (2) the protection of data as required to
mitigate risks.
In this research, the security implications of the US Air Force GeoBase (the US
Air Force’s applied Geospatial Information System) program will be explored. The rapid
expansion of the use of GeoBase to communities outside of the civil engineering field
necessitates an examination of the intrinsic and extrinsic security risks of the
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unconstrained sharing of geospatial information. This research will explore difficulties
encountered when attempting to rate the sensitivity of information, discuss new policies
and procedures that have been implemented undertaken to protect the information, and
propose technical and managerial control measures to facilitate sharing geospatial
information sharing while minimizing the associated operational risks.
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GEOSPATIAL INFORMATIONAL SECURITY RISKS AND CONCERNS
OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE GEOBASE PROGRAM
I. Introduction
Overview
Over the last decade, advancements in information technologies have dramatically
reduced the costs involved with storing, managing and disseminating large amounts of
data. These advancements have led to the development of Geospatial Information
Systems (GIS) within the civil engineering community to share information with larger
communities of interest, enabling complex decisions to be made more efficiently, with
fewer resources, and at higher confidence levels. Military leaders face the challenge of
deciding how to make their geospatial information readily accessible to authorized parties
while mitigating the risks associated with information sharing. Unfortunately, many times
these decisions are made without consideration of the underlying risks to critical
information, infrastructure, and/or resources.
With increasing focus in the Air Force on quick, useful and accurate information,
the GeoBase concept of “One Installation, One Map” has quickly emerged to provide an
integrated common installation picture (CIP) to decision makers. As advancements in
information technology continue to develop, so increases the ability to store, manage and
integrate larger amounts of data. As problems of limited resources of time, money, and
manpower continue to preoccupy organizations, technological advancements such as
Geospatial Information Systems (GIS) and the internet have made it easier and more
affordable to share information once considered unthinkable, allowing complex decisions
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to be made with a more efficient use of resources and at a higher confidence. However,
the same information technologies that allow those that need the information to
accomplish their mission also may provide sensitive information to people with different
agendas. Concerns continue to grow as the geospatial infrastructure makes it easier to
incorporate sensitive information such as the USAF mission data sets (MDS) and
regional information picture (RIP) information. The balance between information
assurance and information sharing is delicate and the community is still sorting out the
best ways to maximize security while encouraging users to share information in order to
provide the widest benefits to the customers and the mission.

Motivations for Research
Motivations for this research stems from the researcher’s personal interest in the
GeoBase program. Having served in a command which embraced the technology early
and instilled at the lowest levels the concepts, potential, and power of GeoBase, the
researcher was among the first to help implement and shape the base-level GeoBase
concepts in Alaska. During the initial implementation new questions were raised about
the existing business practices about sharing these detailed installation maps. These
issues became even more prominent in experiences in Korea, working with multiple
agencies with high turn over rates. Information sharing was essential, yet often requires
access across multiple disclosure levels such as for official use only (FOUO), secret (US
only), and secret (releasable to Republic of Korea, RELROK). The struggle to utilize all
available information while maintaining appropriate levels of classification became a
challenge. Merging information to provide a better decision picture is necessary;
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however, concerns abound about giving information to contractors or other outside
requestors. Those challenging questions are the essence of this research.
Information sharing is essential, yet is hastened by the required multiple levels of
disclosure. With the increasing amounts of geospatial information our military has been
producing, one of the biggest challenges is ensuring that sensitive information is secure
for its intended purposes. As users of the data, we are awed by its availability and
demand quicker, more reliable, accurate, access. In the eagerness to see the potential for
good, we do not always necessarily weigh the potential for bad.

Targeted Research Area
The targeted areas for this research is to review what is known about information
security, risk management, and current USAF policies and guidance applied to geospatial
information found within the USAF GeoBase program as denoted in Figure 1 below. A
focus of this research is to also examine the progress that has been made in efforts to
secure GeoBase’s geospatial information in order to better map out what will be needed
in the future.
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GeoBase
Information
Security
Policies, Practices,
& Procedures
Risk
Management

Figure 1. Targeted Area of Research

Research Goals
The overall research goal is to improve the general understanding of importance
of balance between securing and sharing information in order to maximize USAF mission
processes and minimize customer inefficiencies. By learning what works well and what
does not work well from existing guidance and current problems, we can begin to see
areas rich for improvement. As resources become increasingly limited, it becomes more
important to secure and share them. Understanding the nature of the security risks posed
by GeoBase the Air Force will be better equipped to balance the scales of information
security and information sharing.
Overall Approach to Research
The overall approach to this research is to start with the motivations for research
and develop primary research questions that relate to specific focused objectives which
more broadly describe the intent of what is to be accomplished. Once the questions and
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objectives are defined, then two types of literature reviews will be accomplished. The
first literature review will cast a wide net to learn as much as possible about the topic of
geospatial information, security and information sharing as well as subjects that touch or
impact the topic of the thesis. These key concepts include, but are not limited to:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•

USAF GeoBase Program
Geospatial Information Systems
(GIS)
Information Security
Information Assurance
Information Sharing
Critical Information
Data-sharing policies
Data Stewardship
Risk Management
Security Measures
Sensitive / Critical data access
controls
Data protection
Digital terrorism
Digital Rights Management

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Information Life Cycle
Vulnerability Studies
Terrorism, Information
Technology, and Vulnerability
Knowledge Management
National Map Efforts
Global Information Grid (GIG)
Freedom of Information Act
User Rights and Privileges
Internet Map Servers (IMS)
Data Integration (Security)
DoD Information Policies
Information Resource
Management (IRM)

The second literature review will be geared towards the research methodology and
trying to discover the best way to find the answers we are seeking. Understanding the
pitfalls and possibilities of certain types of research methodologies will help to target the
right tools to accomplish this complicated task. We will learn more about why the
exploratory case study was chosen in the context of our understanding about this topic and
where the GeoBase program office is in its current life cycle and why an exploratory look
is needed. Other considerations for choosing this type of research methodology were the
researcher’s background and interest, the audience, the limited available literature, and the

5

amount of time available for this study. These decision criteria strongly favor this type of
qualitative approach. The difficult part, which encompasses chapters three and four, will
be in developing the framework on how to collect and analyze information. The
conclusions drawn from this framework will help provide answers to our questions so that
we may begin applying this new knowledge in our decisions for the future. Figure 2 below
provides a graphical view of this approach to research and will serve as the road map for
this research effort (see also Appendix A).

Approach to Research Overview

Overall Improve the general understanding of importance of
Research Goal: balance between securing and sharing information.

Primary
Primary Research
Research Questions
Questions

Focused
Focused Objectives
Objectives

Literature
Literature Review
Review

1.
1. What
Whatis
isthe
thenature
natureof
of the
thesecurity
security risk
risk
posed
posed by
by GeoBase?
GeoBase?

1.
1. To
To develop
develop aaset
setof
of general
generalthemes
themes and
and characterizations
characterizationsrelating
relating to
tothe
the
security
security of
of information
information into
intointegrated
integrated geospatial
geospatialinformation
information systems
systems(GIS)
(GIS)

2.
2. What
Whatinformation
informationis
issensitive
sensitive that
thatposes
posesaa
risk
risk to
tosecurity?
security?

2.
2. To
To determine
determine the
the general
general themes
themesand
and characterizations
characterizationsof
of information
informationsharing
sharing
on
ongeospatial
geospatialinformation,
information, specifically
specifically GeoBase.
GeoBase.

3.
3. What
Whatimpacts
impacts might
mightinformation
informationsecurity
security
concerns
concernsaffect
affectinformation
information sharing.
sharing.

3.
3. Assess
Assessthe
theavailability
availability of
of USAF
USAF GeoBase
GeoBase information
information (CIP,
(CIP, RIP,
RIP, and
and MDS).
MDS).

4.
4. What
Whatare
arethe
thekey
key information
informationsystem
system
security
security constructs
constructsand
and their
their
interrelationships?
interrelationships?
5.
5. What
Whatare
arethe
thecosts
costsand
and benefits
benefitsof
of either
either
limiting
limitingor
or providing
providingaccess
accessto
to the
the data?
data?
Do
they
outweigh
the
risks?
Do they outweigh the risks?

4.
4. To
To develop
develop aaconceptual
conceptualframework
frameworkcapturing
capturing the
the impact
impactof
of information
information
sharing
sharing and
andsecurity
security concerns
concerns on
ongeospatial
geospatialdatasets
datasetswithin
withinmilitary
military
installations
(USAF
GeoBase).
installations (USAF GeoBase).
5.
5. To
To use
use an
an exploratory
exploratory case
casestudy
study methodology
methodology to
to determine
determineunderstanding
understandingof
of
current
currentorganizational
organizationalprocedures
proceduresand
and identify
identify potential
potentialareas
areasfor
for
improvement.
improvement.
6.
6. Determine
Determineorganizational
organizationalabilities
abilities to
to implement
implement the
the current
current guidelines
guidelines or
or
recommended
recommended actions
actions to
tocoordinate
coordinate data
data restrictions
restrictions and
and data
data requests.
requests.
7.
7. Develop
Develop// advocate
advocateaa measurement
measurementtool
toolto
to evaluate
evaluate the
the maturity
maturity of
of an
an
organization’s
organization’s GeoBase
GeoBase program
programand
andpolicies/practices
policies/practices to
to ensure
ensure maximum
maximum
security
security and
and user
user potential.
potential.

Motivations
Motivations for
for Research
Research
1.
1. Improve
Improvesystemic
systemic security
security design
design and
and
confidence
confidence in
insharing
sharinginformation
informationacross
across
geospatial
geospatialinformation
information systems
systems(GIS).
(GIS).
2.
2. Provide
Providebetter
better understanding
understanding of
of what
whatisis
“appropriate
“appropriate access”
access” to
togeospatial
geospatial
information
information
3.
3. To
To strengthen
strengthenfuture
futurepolicies
policies and
and
guidance
guidanceto
to better
better safeguard
safeguardinformation
information
while
whileproviding
providingwider
wider benefits
benefits to
to the
the
customer
and
the
mission.
customer and the mission.

for
forreleasing
releasing//publishing
publishingdata
data our
ourAirmen
Airmenshould
shouldbe
be
following?)
following?)

2.
2. With
Withwhom
whomis
isinformation
informationshared
shared and
and who
who are
are
the
the GeoBase
GeoBase information
informationcustomers?
customers?
3.
3. Explore
Exploredefinitions,
definitions, constructs,
constructs, concepts,
concepts,
frameworks,
frameworks, and
andmodels
modelsin
in related
related fields
fieldsof
of
interest,
interest, such
suchas:
as:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Geospatial Information Systems (GIS)
Information Security
Information Assurance
Critical Information
Risk Management
GeoBase
Security Measures
Sensitive / Critical data access controls
Data protection
Digital terrorism
Digital Rights Management
Information Life Cycle
Vulnerability Studies
Terrorism, Information Technology, and
Vulnerability
• Data Integration

Applications
Applications

(Potential
(Potential Benefits)
Benefits)

FRAMEWORK
FRAMEWORK DEVELOPMENT
DEVELOPMENT

(Synthesize
(Synthesize Information
Informationin
in Literature
LiteratureReview)
Review)

Case
Case
Analysis
Analysis

Field
Field Work
Work
Data
Data
Collection
Collection

Recommendations
Recommendations for
for
Future
Future Research
Research

1.
1. What
Whatis
isthe
thecurrent
currentGeoBase
GeoBasepolicy
policy and
and
guidance
guidanceon
onsecuring
securing and
and sharing
sharing
information?
(Whatare
arethe
thestandard
standardguidelines
guidelines
information? (What

Limitations
Limitations

Research
Research
Design
Design
Case
CaseData
Data
Collection
Collection Protocol
Protocol

Case
Case
Database
Database

Figure 2. Research Design [adapted from (West, 2006)]
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1.
1. Exploratory
Exploratory Case
Case Study
Study
This
This isis also
alsoaadescriptive
descriptivecase
casestudy
study
but
butisis aimed
aimedat
atgenerating
generating
hypotheses
hypotheses for
forlater
laterinvestigation
investigation
rather
ratherthan
thanillustrating.
illustrating.(GAO,
(GAO,1990)
1990)
Its
Its function
functionisis to
todevelop
developthe
the
evaluation
evaluationquestions,
questions,measures,
measures,
designs,
designs,and
andanalytic
analyticstrategy
strategy for
forthe
the
bigger
biggerstudy.
study.(GAO,
(GAO,1990,
1990,pg
pg40)
40)
Exploration
Explorationbegins
begins with
with some
somesort
sortof
of
rationale
rationaleand
anddirection,
direction, even
evenififlater
later
proven
provenwrong
wrong(Yin,
(Yin, 2003,
2003,pg
pg 23).
23).

Case
CaseSelection
Selection

TBD
TBD

Methodology
Methodology
Literature
Literature Review
Review

Primary Research Questions
Six primary research questions, listed below in Table 1, support and strengthen this
overall research goal and form the primary goals (PG) of this research.
Table 1. Primary Research Questions
Primary
Research
Question

PG1
PG2

Description

What is the nature of the security risk posed by GeoBase?
What information is sensitive that poses a risk to security?

PG3

What impacts might information security concerns affect information
sharing?

PG4

What are the key information system security constructs and their
interrelationships?

PG5

What are the impacts of information security on information sharing
within the GeoBase community?

PG6

What are the costs and benefits of either limiting or providing access to
the data? Do they outweigh the risks?

Focused Objectives
The following seven focused objectives (FO), in Table 2, help to concentrate on how the
primary research questions and the potential benefits of the research come together. These
help to give a better idea of the direction and actions that this research will strive to
accomplish.
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Table 2. Focused Objective Questions
Focused
Objectives

Description

Primary
Research
Questions
Addressed

To develop a set of general themes and
characterizations relating to the sharing of
information and relative security concerns into
integrated geospatial information systems (GIS)
To determine the general themes and
characterizations of information sharing and
security on geospatial information security
concerns relating to the impacts of geospatial
information, specifically GeoBase mission data
sets (MDS).
Assess the availability of USAF GeoBase
information (CIP, RIP, and MDS).

PG1

PB1, PB2, PB3,
PB5

PG2

PB1, PB2, PB4,
PB5

PG1, PG2

PB1, PB2, PB3,
PB4, PB5

To develop a conceptual framework capturing the
impact of information sharing and security
concerns on geospatial datasets within military
installations (USAF GeoBase).

PG1, PG2

PB3, PB4, PB5

To use an exploratory case study methodology to
determine understanding of current organizational
procedures and identify potential areas for
improvement.
Determine organizational abilities to implement
the current guidelines or recommended actions to
coordinate data restrictions and data requests.
Develop / advocate a measurement tool to
evaluate the maturity of an organization’s
GeoBase program and policies/practices to ensure
maximum security and user potential.

PG1, PG2

PB1, PB2, PB3,
PB4

PG1, PG2

PB1, PB2, PB3,
PB4

PG1, PG2

PB1, PB2, PB3,
PB4

Potential
Benefits of
Research
Addressed
(see Table 1.3)

FO1

FO2

FO3

FO4

FO5
FO6
FO7

Benefits / Implications of Research
This research will provide insight as to issues associated with the accuracy, access,
and availability of geospatial information. These insights into the current challenges of
information security and information sharing that the GeoBase program faces help to
provide a more accurate target for the implementation of new policies and guidance,
measures of control, or reengineering efforts of existing business processes. Table 3,
below, identifies six specific benefits, but does not limit future possibilities.
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Table 3. Potential Benefits of Research
Potential
Benefit

Description

PB1

Identify needs and priorities for future investigation

PB2

Provide background research for the development of evaluation
questions or measurement strategy (metrics)

PB3

Strengthen future information security / assurance policies

PB4

Improve confidence in system = willingness to share more information

PB5

More shared information = wider benefits to customers and mission

PB6

Establish a baseline of present organizational policies to compare
effectiveness of new policies

Thesis Overview
This thesis includes five chapters and supporting information found in the
appendices. This first chapter has provided an introduction and overview to the research
questions. The second chapter will provide a more detailed review of the existing literature
and begins to examine the context of what geospatial information is, introduce the Air
Force’s GeoBase program, and discuss problems, policies, risks, challenges, and touch on
some of the recommended solutions and current control measures. Chapter 3 will then
discuss the research strategy and why the exploratory case study methodology was
selected, evaluate potential pitfalls to research, and explain how this case study was
designed. Chapter 4 will then begin analyzing the case database, populated by sources of
evidence and investigative protocol discussed in the case study design section of chapter
three to answer the primary research questions. Chapter 5 will include further discussion
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and recommendations along with possible limitations and future research ideas. Readers
can find additional supporting information for this research in the back of this report under
the appendices, bibliography, and researcher’s vita.
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II. Background
Introduction
The literature review contains detailed information on topics that are relevant to this
research effort. This chapter will introduce information security, explain what geospatial
information is, give a brief history of the GeoBase program; the emergence of geospatial
technologies; the new paradigms, problems, and policies that have materialized; and
provide a comprehensive review of the most recent information security and information
sharing literature.
What is Information Security?
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), define information security as that which “protects
information from a wide range of threats in order to ensure business continuity, minimize

business damage and maximize return on investments and business opportunities”
(ISO/IEC 17799, 2000). Since information is a valuable asset, particularly in a national
security and military environment, it must be protected. “Information can exist in many
forms. It can be printed or written on paper, stored electronically, transmitted by post or
using electronic means, shown on films, or spoken in conversation. Whatever form the
information takes, or means by which it is shared or stored, it should always be
appropriately protected” (ISO/IEC 17799, 2000). This research will later discuss the
different controls that can and are being implemented to achieve information security in the
GeoBase program. We will explore the different policies, practices, procedures,
organizational structures and software functions established to ensure that the specific
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security objectives of the GeoBase program are met. (ISO/IEC 17799, 2000). This
research will explore these forms as they relate to geospatial information.
What is Geospatial Information?
Geospatial information can be defined as any information that identifies the
geographic location and characteristics of both natural and man-made earth-bound features.
(Zettler, 2002). The types of geospatial information range from specific latitude and
longitude coordinates to a general description of where something is located. These can
take on the form of maps, overhead images, datasets, websites, addresses (Baker et al,
2004). “Geographic location is a key feature of 80-90% of all governmental data (Federal
Geographic Data Committee, 2005). The Air Force has begun to use geospatial
information to manage their installation infrastructure assets, for example, the locations of
power distribution, water, sewer, telecommunications, and roads are stored within a
database. Although geospatial information is diverse, it is still information, which is why it
is important to understand the laws and policies that form the basis for rule sets used for
managing both geospatial and non-geospatial information (Cullis, 2004).

GeoBase History
The art of mapping has not changed much over the centuries, but the understanding
of the world, new tools, and improved technologies have enabled us to communicate better
and know more about the environment that have served as the catalyst for the evolution of
mapping. The most recent advances in technology and policy have culminated in
innovative ways in which the U.S. Air Force approaches the process of mapping
installations. These new applied technologies have enabled more informed decisions
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through the comprehensive new mapping and information strategy for the USAF known as
GeoBase. “The GeoBase program, officially launched in the summer of 2001 by the Air
Force Civil Engineer, has transformed the traditional surveying and mapping process into
an invaluable information resource for the larger installation mission, both at the home
station and in the deployed environment” (Cullis and Tinsley, 2004).
GeoBase was the result of a structural, strategic, and tactical improvement. At the
heart of this massive new reengineering effort was the customer.
“To realize the full benefits of the knowledge revolution, the geospatial
information user community must redesign and improve how it does its business.
This will require significant changes in culture, organization, education, and
processes. For example, the geospatial information technology professional must
become a full partner with the customer in defining operational needs for
information, and exploring promising new technologies.”
-

3 CES Geospatial Information System Strategic Plan, 1999

Although GeoBase was not directly touted directly as a reengineering effort, it
certainly can be classified as one as it held central to its mission and the end user
(customer). This thesis will in part examine why a complete reengineering approach was
needed, how the Air Force was able to successfully incorporate change in a culture steeped
in resistance, as well as what some of the challenges management faced in making such a
radical shift in the way in which bases are mapped and information is provided.
Just because converting bases over to GIS had not worked, it did not mean it was
not the right strategy for the Air Force. By the late 1990s, several things had changed.
Technology had advanced addressing previous customer concerns and was becoming much
more affordable. Leaders throughout the different commands emerged; in particular, a
leader emerged who understood what GIS could do for the Air Force and its mission.
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Additionally, this person understood the need for paradigm shift in the way the Air Force
executes its mapping business. In the fall of 1998, Colonel Brian J. Cullis coined the term
“GeoBase” and had a clear vision of what the future could be and was well prepared to
accept the challenge of being a change agent. One of the first things that was needed was
to clearly separate the negative reputation that GIS was receiving due to the previous failed
management attempts. The distinguishing new GeoBase concept was something new, it
carried with it a clear vision and well developed plan for implementation. This new vision,
“One Installation…One Map”, required a complete redesign of the way business was done.
Implementation Plans were customized to each installation to help them traverse the path of
change. The art of communication, education and persuasion were essential in helping the
highest-ranking General to the newest Airman understand why there was a need for change
and what they could do to help enable the required reengineering efforts.
From the beginning, it was clearly articulated that GeoBase is not a system,
package, program, button, or particular software application, but rather a process or a
complete integration effort. In essence, it was to be a new way of thinking about the data
we use and collect. This new way of thinking included a way to use maps to display and
integrate data, leveraging the best available commercial off-the-shelf GIS and GPS
technologies to produce a composite Common Installation Picture (CIP). The CIP serves
as the one picture portraying different databases across multiple functions. The concept of
“One Installation…One Map” enables existing stovepipes to begin cross ventilating
without having to overhaul the entire piping infrastructure.
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Emerging Geospatial Technologies
In the mid 1980s and early 90s the Air Force began adopting different types of
information technology to aid in the drafting and design of construction projects and base
maps. Computer Aided Design and Drafting (CADD) is an enabling technology solution
that helped address some of the initial problems of drafting by hand. Just as the
organizations were determining the possibilities of having a digital CADD map,
innovations in technology were being made in quantum leaps. Innovations such as Global
Positioning Systems (GPS), affordable handheld GPS receivers, aerial and commercial
satellite imagery, and Geospatial Information Systems (GIS) began opening the doors to
new possibilities in the world of mapping.

A New Paradigm
The Air Force has made changes through the years from hand-drafted maps to
computer-aided drafting, to today’s revolution in utilizing Geospatial Information Systems
(GIS) in the reengineered efforts of military mapping and decision-making.
“For the past three years, I’ve been immersed in managing change—change
in how we employ geospatial information technologies to best support the
defense installation mission. There is much written about the difficulties of
leading change across large organizations with their many parochial
interests. However, I have discovered that if you focus on what these
disparate organizations have in common, such as the need for a map, it is
much easier to achieve a broad consensus for change. And whether it’s the
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young engineer assistant in the utilities shop at an Air Force base or an
undersecretary of defense at the Pentagon, they are all eager and willing to
learn of practical ways to employ geospatial technologies to perform their
assigned missions more effectively” (Fuhr, 2004).
Col Brian Cullis
Executive Manager, Defense
Installation, Spatial Data
Infrastructure (DISDI)
It is due to the understanding of the customer needs and mission requirements, and
the culture for change, which allowed the Air Force to embark on a reengineering to make
such substantial improvements in their processes. As an organization, the Air Force must
continue to seek improvements and maintain vigilance of its customers, competition, and
be willing to change in order to stay on top.

New Paradigms, New Problems
The Air Force’s mission has been defining its direction since its inception in 1947.
In December 2005, Secretary of the Air Force Michael W. Wynne and Air Force Chief of
Staff Gen. T. Michael Moseley issued a joint Letter to Airmen stating, "Today, our world is
fast paced, constantly shifting, and filled with a wide range of challenges. Our mission is
our guiding compass, and now more than ever we need it to be clear and precise.
Therefore, we have rewritten the Air Force’s mission statement to define where and what
we do...The mission of the United States Air Force is to deliver sovereign options for the
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defense of the United States of America and its global interests -- to fly and fight in Air,
Space, and Cyberspace.” (Moseley and Wayne, 2005).
The new mission includes two new concepts, “sovereign options” and
“cyberspace”. The incorporation of cyberspace into the mission recognizes the importance
of information security and information sharing. In the new world of cyberspace,
geospatial data makes up approximately one-half of the nation’s domestic economic
activities and provides the edge in international competitiveness (Cullis, 2004). Once made
strong by abundant natural resources and industrial revolution, countries and businesses are
finding power in a new information revolution. For the military, international
competitiveness is the ability to fly, flight, and win. As industrial resources become more
readily available and begin to equalize the playing field, today’s world competitors seek to
differentiate themselves through their abilities to manage information and knowledge. The
demand for information and knowledge drives the need for new data. As the data and the
dependency on data continue to increase, new problems and demands arise. In 2005, a
survey of the metadata in the nation’s geospatial depository, Geospatial One-Stop, shows
the federal government as the largest geospatial data producer, see Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Top Geospatial Data Producers (Federal Geographic Data Committee, 2006)
Within the federal government, the Department of the Interior is the largest producer of
geospatial data, as shown in Figure 4. The Department of Defense has invested heavily in
information systems over the last few years and is producing a significant amount of
geospatial data, much of which is not loaded in the Geospatial One-Stop system.
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Figure 4. Federal Agencies Producing Geospatial Data (Federal Geographic Data
Committee, 11 Aug 2006)
Geospatial information has continued to increase exponentially, as seen over the past ten
years in Figure 5.
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Figure 5. Geospatial Information on the Rise (Federal Geographic Data Committee, 2006)

As geospatial information systems have been rapidly expanding in the civilian
sector, the USAF GeoBase program has witnessed tremendous growth as the need for
minimizing fiscal waste and maximizing decision power has grown. This growth stemmed
from the Air Force Civil Engineering (CE) community, whose need to provide accuracy,
access, and accountability of installation assets drove an investment in the required
equipment, skills, and additional data to form the geospatial information infrastructure
called GeoBase.
Additional evidence of the expansion of geospatial information can be seen in the
formation of the Defense Installation Spatial Data Infrastructure (DISDI) program in late
2004. This program was set up in the fall of 2004 to “organize the broad geospatial data
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investments found across the business mission area of the DoD’s Global Information Grid.”
(B. J. Cullis, Jul 26, 2005). DISDI’s successes in helping to provide focus to the entire DoD
came as a result of seeing the need to reign in individual IT efforts across its massive
organization. “DISDI is described today as a DoD mission capability comprised of those
people, policies and practices necessary to acquire, steward and share “best available”
installation and environmental geospatial data assets across the Global Information Grid—a
system to provide users a seamless, secure, and interconnected information environment,
for the real-time and near real-time needs of both the warfighter and the business user” (B.
J. Cullis, Jul 26, 2005). Through the collected efforts of DISDI and GIS communities, a
common direction and enterprise solution was adopted. Today, there is an establishment of
not only the Air Force’s GeoBase program, but also DoD GIS efforts that include the
Navy’s GeoReadiness, the Marines’ GeoFidelis, and the Army’s GIS-R, which is the
Army’s Installation Geographic Information & Services (IGI&S) program office. The
expansion of program offices and mission related applications just within the last five years
shows the need for accurate geospatial information technologies that provide critical
information which enables decision makers, supports war fighters, aids planners, and
increases overall situational awareness.

New Problems, New Policies
As new technologies emerged, government began to quickly feel the need to set
policies and procedures to govern the use and application of the emergent technologies.
Mapping efforts were becoming a more collaborative effort and needed cohesive
management practices due to individual bases developing best practices. The problem
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escalates when Airman Jones PCSs (changes duty assignments) and had been trained a
certain way to accomplish the job and when in a new environment she must be retrained.
The cost to retrain and relearn skills from one base to another was adding undue stress to an
increasingly lean organization. Therefore, in the interest of finite resources a lowest
common denominator approach became the applied practice, which did not warrant
government funding or training.
New trepidations arose as the GeoBase program was implemented throughout the
major commands. The same information technologies that allow those that need the
information to accomplish their mission also may provide sensitive information to people
with different agendas. Concerns continue to grow as the geospatial infrastructure makes it
easier to incorporate sensitive information such as the USAF mission data sets (MDS) and
regional information picture (RIP) information. The balance between information
assurance and information sharing is delicate and the community is still sorting out the best
ways to maximize security while encouraging users to share information in order to provide
the widest benefits to the customers and the mission.
Post 9/11
No one event helped solidify those fears more than the September 11 2001 attacks.
“After terrorists attacked the Pentagon and World Trade Center buildings, most
governmental agencies hastily withheld map data and other records from the public, thus
curtailing citizens’ ability to inform themselves” (Tombs, 2005). New requirements and
guidance were needed for the management of data and federal information assets that relate
to geographic locations. Some agencies do not recognize that geospatial data is public
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record. “Legal cases at both the federal and state levels have nearly ended that assertion,
which is now codified by many state public records acts and FOIA (Freedom of
Information Act)” (Tombs, 2005). It has taken three years for the different arms of the
government to publish Guidelines for Providing Appropriate Access to Geospatial Data in
Response to Homeland Security Concerns (Federal Geographic Data Committee, Jun
2005).
The challenge now is defining the legal guidelines for what is “sensitive
information”. Sensitive information has been defined as “Information that requires
protection due to the risk and magnitude of loss or harm that could result from inadvertent
or deliberate disclosure, alteration, or destruction of the information. The term includes
information whose improper use or disclosure could adversely affect the ability of an
agency to accomplish its mission, proprietary information, records about individuals
requiring protection under the Privacy Act, and information not releasable under the
Freedom of Information Act.” (Swanson, Hash, Wilson, and Kissel, 2005:C-10). In times
of fear, such as during the war on terrorism, new emphasis has been placed “on undefined
‘potential’ and ‘possible’ risks to ‘sensitive’ or ‘critical infrastructure’ in prohibiting public
spatial data access. While deliberating what records are ‘sensitive’ and ‘who’ should be
prohibited access, records custodians are improperly using the ‘homeland security’ excuse
to ignore records access laws” (Tombs, 2005).
Prior to 9/11, many of these concerns had never come into question. New laws
continue to influence the evolution of how managing and protecting information, to include
the Air Force’s GeoBase data for its installations and expeditionary sites. The Homeland
Security Act of 2002 and the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002
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brought new definitions affecting information systems and security. Information security is
defined in public law as:
“…protecting information and information systems from unauthorized access, use,
disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction in order to provide: integrity,
which means guarding against improper information modification or destruction,
and includes ensuring information non-repudiation and authenticity; confidentiality,
which means preserving authorized restrictions on access and disclosure, including
means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information; and availability,
which means ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information.” Federal Information Security Management Act – Public Law 107-347.
It is interesting in looking at the timeline of laws passed to see how definitions have
changed over the years and are reflective of the major concerns and events of history, see
Appendix E. Ultimately, we are all affected by the courts decisions. Appendix F offers a
history of policy and guidance that has directly shaped and impacted the implementation
and development of the USAF GeoBase program.
As the development of new technologies and concern for how those technologies
are applied develop, so expands the social and legal structures within which they exist.
This work will explore the supporting legal structures that attempts to set the boundaries
for society to ultimately insure the safety and security of its citizens by looking at the laws
and policies that affect the existence of the USAF GeoBase program.
Geospatial Information and the Law
As early as 1950, the federal government recognized the importance of managing
information and established the Federal Records Act of 1950 which appointed the National
Archives and Records Administration (NARA) as the primary agency responsible for
management and oversight which cultivated the framework for records management
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programs for all federal agencies. The importance of ensuring that nationally important
transactions are recorded and safeguarded against loss remains a constant even as the
government shifts from paper to e-government. Federal laws and regulations have helped
establish common good practices for creating, using, and maintaining information that may
be useful in making future decisions. As technology grows, so has the capability to store,
maintain, and share information. One of the major concerns rising from the amassing of
information was privacy. In 1974, the Privacy Act was established to regulate the
“collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of personal information by federal
executive branch agencies and generally characterized as a “code of fair information
practices” (United States Department of Justice, 2004). However, the Act's ill-defined
language limited legislative case law history and made it difficult to interpret and apply.
This is particularly notable as the laws are beginning to catch up with the capabilities of
new information technologies and new systems, with particular interest in the growing
utilization of geospatial information systems (GIS).
As the need to find more efficient ways to do business and manage increasing
resources, the legislature passed new public laws to herd agencies into being more publicly
accountable for reducing the mounting burdens of required paperwork and red tape. In
1995, Public Law 104-12, the Paperwork Reduction Act was signed, which eventually lead
to the Government Paperwork Elimination Act in 1999. The Paperwork Elimination Act
was monumental as the first law to establish guidance for the use of electronic signature
technology, requiring “when practicable, Federal agencies use electronic forms, electronic
filing, and electronic signatures to conduct official business with the public by 2003. In
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doing this, agencies will create records with business, legal and, in some cases, historical
value” (National Archives and Records Administration, 2000).
As agencies received guidance from their governing bodies, many organizations,
including the Air Force began to realize the opportunities these laws created in fulfilling
goals and requirements to eliminate waste and increase efficiency. As the government has
spent over $27.9 billion on information technology annually, laws have been passed to help
ensure that departments are making sound investment decisions which effectively align IT
projects with their business planning and measurement processes. The Clinger-Cohen Act
(CCA) of 1996 “provides that the government information technology shop be operated
exactly as an efficient and profitable business would be operated. Acquisition, planning and
management of technology must be treated as a "capital investment." While the law is
complex, all consumers of hardware and software in the Department should be aware of the
Chief Information Officer's leadership in implementing this statute” (United States
Department of Education, 2004). These new laws set the new standards forcing
organizations to develop and organize information management capabilities to meet the
different missions of government agencies.
As the Air Force found new uses for the GPS and GIS technologies and the
GeoBase program emerged, these laws laid the groundwork for putting into perspective the
need for change. GeoBase was the product of the combination of these laws, policies, and
executive directives that has now helped to organize and streamline geospatial information
into a powerful situational awareness and decision maker’s tool.
Soon, Geospatial Information System Strategic Plans began to emerge which
reflected new priorities and attitudes within government. Each plan was custom tailored to
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each base and designed to conform to multiple governmental directives such as the
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), and
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) mandates and guidelines. “These bodies of
laws and regulations created the opportunity to move from budget and acquisition centric
decision making to mission, architecture, service, and performance decision making” (Geo
InSight International, Inc., 1999). In 1996, the Information Technology (IT) Management
Reform Act was passed, which required federal agencies, including DoD, to identify a
Chief Information Officer (CIO) and regulate IT investments. This was the first time
“organizations were now required to strategically plan IT purchases and link them to
specific mission goals” (Cullis and Tinsley, 2004).
Geospatial information offers new and exciting opportunities in expanding fields of
interest. Accuracy, access, and accountability are the demands of the future and many
different points of view will drive the need for the future legal clarifications and guidance
(Schomper & et al, 1996). Examples of debates over geospatial information today include,
personal privacy, sensitive vs. classified information, and liability on information provided,
need for shared information (such as emergency responders and environmental care takers).
GIS analysts and technicians continue to discover new applications and resume aggregating
once lonely islands of information with the powerful bridging tools that geographic
information systems provide.
These new applications of technology in to the GeoBase concept help to broaden
our knowledge and expanding our capabilities. With new capabilities come new
responsibilities. Future laws, policies and procedures will help information users and data
stewards to continue to weight the fine balancing act of the need for national information
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security and information sharing in an increasingly demanding environment for accuracy,
access, and accountability.

Identifying Security Risks
As the military seeks to make more informed decisions based on information from
geospatially related data, there are increasing concerns that this reliance may be exploited.
To better understand the risk, the threats and vulnerabilities to the system must be
understood. Solomon and Chapple define a vulnerability as “a weakness in a system that
may be exploited to degrade or bypass standard security mechanisms” and a threat as “a set
of external circumstances that allow a vulnerability to be exploited” (Solomon and
Chapple, 2005). When vulnerabilities and threats overlap, this relationship defines what
the risks are, as seen in Figure 6.

Threats

Risks

Vulnerabilities

Figure 6. Identifying Risks (Solomon and Chapple, 2005)

There are a wide variety of common computer threats from viruses, worms, Trojan
horses, port scanning, file share attacks, Operating System (OS) attacks, scams, spamming,
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phishing, denial of services attacks, password guessing, backdoors, sweepers, sniffers,
packet forge spoofing, IP spoofing, to the most obscure such as social engineering (Speed,
Ellis, & Korper, 2002). However, concerns regarding the interception of data, theft /
release of sensitive or confidential information, unauthorized access to privileged
information, theft of other computer hardware or devices, system penetration by an
outsider, laptop and hand held computer thefts, computer system and network abuse, and
sabotage of sabotage of data or networks are also among the top breaches of security
(Australian Institute of Criminology 2006, 2006). Among these real threats, the greatest
risk to the security policies is not the physical network, but rather the accountability of the
people within the organization. By far, our human nature is our greatest danger. However,
we can help mitigate this threat by physically designing the network to be safer, educating
our airmen and enforcing the standards set out by the security policies and defined by
routinely conducted vulnerability assessments.
The Air Force must also consider the physical security of the system itself, the
management of the database and its integrity, as well as the type and scope of access to the
database. Protection of the availability of services and information is important to ensuring
that users have access to the information when it is needed. The issue that geospatial
information is available publicly is not the only security risk, in 2000 there were a reported
25,000 attempted intrusions into the defense system. Of those attacks, 245 of them were
successful. Of this less than 1% of successful attacks, 96% of those were found to be
preventable if users had followed established protocols (Onley, 25 April 2004). The
network security on which the GeoBase data relies is heavily monitored and network
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personnel continue to strive to improve network security by limiting the access to the
system and implementing policies such as mandating firewall protection, confidential user
accounts and passwords, no shared accounts, password-protections, locating computers and
servers in a physically secure environment, establishing file permissions and user rights on
certain files and folders, and separating classified information on separate systems. Beyond
the security of the network, let us discuss the primary issues that are more closely related to
the risks of geospatial information and the capabilities that these systems provide.
Only recently has public access to information become a perceived concern
(Tombs, 2005). Following the attacks on 9/11, almost overnight, federal officials became
worried that some public information is now too public and “agencies cut off access to
thousands of documents on the Internet, ordered certain information in government
libraries to be withheld or even destroyed, and simply stopped providing some information
that used to be routinely released to the public” (Matthews, 2002). The concerns over
providing a terrorist access to information that would help him develop or use a weapon of
mass destruction lies at the heart of our fears. “Thus, digital maps are no longer available
online from the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, a CD-ROM containing
information on the nation's water supplies was ordered destroyed at depository libraries,
and tens of thousands of documents vanished from government Web sites. The information
clampdown has touched off a sprawling debate over how much information should be —
and legally can be — withheld from the public” (Matthews, 2002). Soon after, the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), now the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency (NGA), asked the RAND Corporation to assist in developing a framework to
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assess the security implications of publicly available geospatial information. This study
remains among the few to address these specific types of implications and provides a broad
base for future research. Their studies began to put into perspective the scope of federal
geospatial information, finding it to be widespread across “465 programs, offices, or major
initiatives at 30 different federal agencies and departments that make various types of
geospatial information publicly accessible” (Baker et al, 2004). RAND concluded that
very few (6% of the 629 datasets studied) appeared to be capable of fulfilling possible
terrorist’s needs. Even fewer sites (less than 1%) were found to provide critical
information, both useful and unique, by their definition to potential terrorists. They also
noted that in so many cases, since geospatial information exists in numerous ways,
alternate forms of the same information existed readily in the public domain, beyond the
control of federal sources” (Baker et al, 2004).
The level of risk that we are willing to take hinges on the values that we place on
the following three strategic factors of information: data accuracy, access, and
accountability (Schomper et al, 1996). Evaluating the impacts of not having accurate
information, timely access to it when needed, or responsible ways of accounting for the
demands of information will help in the understanding of the risks that are willing to
accept. This game of risk is one of compromise.

Top Challenges
The goal of reducing the security risks and increasing the range of access across
communities and knowledge seekers is not sought without challenge. The primary
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challenges discussed in this section are not unique to only the GeoBase program, but are
challenges that leaders in information management face when dealing with information
security and information sharing. The first hurdle that must be overcome is in how we
define, or do not define, the sensitivity of information. We will look at issues surrounding
the classification of information, sharing information, and the inconsistencies of policies
and guidance and see how these add to the top challenges of creating a defensible
geospatial information strategy.

Defining the Sensitivity of Information
Among the top challenges in the balance of information security and information
sharing is defining the sensitivity of information. In times of fear, such as during the war on
terrorism, new emphasis has been placed “on undefined ‘potential’ and ‘possible’ risks to
‘sensitive’ or ‘critical infrastructure’ in prohibiting public spatial data access. While
deliberating what records are ‘sensitive’ and ‘who’ should be prohibited access, records
custodians are improperly using the ‘homeland security’ excuse to ignore records access
laws” (Tombs, 2005). Concerns over how the government chooses to define "sensitive but
unclassified" information fuel hesitation to share information. Government watchdogs fear
that a new sensitive information category could give agencies a way to hide embarrassing
information from public scrutiny (Matthews, 2002). There are so many factors to be
considered when deriving a definition of sensitive information. Even if something is
considered “sensitive”, geospatial data has a tendency to change over time. As the
environment and value of the information changes, so do the risks to security. It is not
viable to make one decision in the lifespan of the data, but a constant litmus test must be
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made which can alter the decisions about access. These decisions affect not only the
originating organization, but also the entire chain of users both up and down the
information stream (Federal Geographic Data Committee, 2005).
The classification of data has been the most effective way to manage the differences
in the level of risk that certain data bears. Once the challenge of identifying what
information is sensitive, there becomes multiple challenges in applying a designation to
information. Overprotecting data severely hinders users that depend on using that
information on a day-to-day basis in doing their job and accomplishing the mission.
Restricting information has tremendous costs, in not only the added time and maintenance
costs that it takes to manage that information, but also the expanded personnel safety risks.
For example, consider electrical or natural gas distribution lines that are part of the critical
infrastructure of an installation. If these distribution lines are classified as “SECRET”, it
would result in a tremendous impact on the electricians and utility personnel responsible
for maintaining those lines, not to mention the safety hazards for construction crews getting
ready to dig in an area where utility lines have not been identified to them. Limiting access
to information may have greater risks associated. It is very important to select data
protection measures that are commensurate to all the risks; in order to classify or restrict
access to data; the risks must outweigh the benefits (United States Air Force, Air Mobility
Command, 2005).
Air Force policy towards restricting access to geospatial data is the exception rather
than the rule (Dunn, 2005). These restrictions “must be approved by the appropriate
Headquarters Air Force (HAF) functional manager and must be based on public law,
security classification or other DoD regulatory publication” (Dunn, 2005). Restrictions are
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to “only be applied to the data identified and not the entire system or collective group of
data in which it resides or is produced” (Dunn, 2005). Problems with this type of policy
reside in the burden of management to track and communicate the necessary restrictions
across multiple agencies and changing personnel.
The challenge to data owners and stewards is to define what “sensitive information”
is explicitly. The current guideline that is offered to the geospatial data community for
identifying sensitive data, determining their risks, and assessing benefits is based on three
factors: 1) risk to security, 2) uniqueness, and 3) net benefit of disseminating the data.
These three factors were central to the Federal Geographic Data Committee (FGDC) as
they developed a decision tree intended to act as a guideline to help organizations decide on
what is reasonable access to sensitive data as shown in Figure 7 (Federal Geographic Data
Committee, 2005). It remains important to launch discussions within organizations so that
they can begin to ask the initial questions to evaluate the content of their information.
Guidelines such as these help to provide an evaluation method that offers a hope for
consistency.
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Figure 7. Decision Tree for Providing Appropriate Access to Geospatial Data in Response
to Security Concerns (Federal Geographic Data Committee, 2005)
The sensitivity of derived geospatial data offers additional challenges. There are no
established and validated mathematical formulas that can estimate the values of sensitivity
when combining or querying multiple datasets. The same thought process in determining
the sensitivity of the original work should be applied each time data is extracted or
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combined to create a new way of looking at the information it provides (Federal
Geographic Data Committee, 2005). Concerns over these derived geospatial datasets
supplicate the trepidations of aggregating information. At what level of aggregation does
information become sensitive? The GeoBase program recognizes that there are some
instances where storing and providing access to aggregated data would constitute a
vulnerability, but work diligently to provide protection. Currently, each installation is
responsible for performing periodic reviews on all datasets and combinations thereof to
determine if they come together and constitute an unacceptable risk (United States Air
Force, Air Mobility Command, 2005).
Information Sharing
Although on smaller scale, the GeoBase offices have experienced the same type of
challenges the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is facing in encouraging
organizations to voluntarily share information. There is a sense of hesitation and
uncertainty among data owners to share information, perhaps over fear liability,
embarrassment, or a fear of loosing power or control. Regardless, the importance of sharing
is paramount to ensuring consistent, well-informed decisions are being made. Failing to
provide information, leaves data users to pursue and use less reliable sources. The U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO) captures the sentiment of many organizations in
their March 2006 report entitled, Information Sharing: The Federal Government Needs to
Establish Policies and Processes for Sharing Terrorism Related and Sensitive but
Unclassified Information. Their report highlights the problems that offices such as the
GeoBase office in the Air Force faces as an information broker, both a user and provider of
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geospatial information. One of the biggest challenges is in the identification and
designation of sensitive information. The GAO study found that over 26 federal agencies
surveyed, there where 56 different sensitive but unclassified designations (Powner and
Larence, 2006). Typically, GeoBase offices are faced primarily with the following three
designations: Classified (SECRET), For Official Use Only (FOUO), and Unclassified. The
challenges of managing classified information have been discussed, but we can quickly see
how intertwined these challenges are and the need to overcome these hurdles in the quest of
sharing information. For example, consider emergency responders and command and
control functions, such as the Survival Recovery Center (SRC) or Damage Control Groups
(DCG), abilities to coordinate a safe cordon around a hazardous chemical spill without
informative maps and critical geospatial information. If information is not shared and
available for the people who need it to respond to emergencies or make command
decisions, we have failed to secure ourselves by giving the most to the situation we
possibly could. Geospatial information provides the security of knowing that the people
making decisions have the tools they need to ensure our safety.
An initial challenge of the GeoBase community was getting other organizations to
understand the benefits of sharing information and realizing the power of a collective
information bank. If information owners had a negative experience or the collective system
did not satisfy their requirements, the willingness to share was gone, thus the potential to
leverage their information against other has vanished. Most concerns associated with
sharing information were related to the ability to ensure their information would be
protected with at least the same level of effort (Powner and Larence, 2006).
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The development of multi-level agreements would help users understand the
responsibilities and the organization understand what information should be given out and
to whom. Examples of multi-level agreements are every time the Air Force collaborates
with commercial entities, such as engineering design and construction firms, which require
data for contract execution. Often times, sharing data between services such as the Air
Force and the Army, causes its own set of problems, creating duplicate datasets between
services is against the “one installation, one map” motto. Serving overseas and working
with a host nation has created difficulties in reaching agreements. Multiple systems, often
found overseas, require careful attention in detailing what can and cannot be shared. There
is data that different agencies and countries need to be able to share, but in some situations
this is not happening. Once the data is shared, there are very few controls that remain in
place. Some of the major architectural-engineering firms have files and files of critical
geospatial information in their project files and reference libraries. Although there are
signed agreements, disclaimers, and consents, which are given at the time of data
conveyance, the reality of the business process is that the government just has to trust that
others understand the costs to security.

Inconsistencies in Policies and Guidance
The inconsistency of policies and guidance that drive business process continue to
add complication to the information security challenge. Numerous existing studies,
policies, instructions, guidance, recommendations, and directives have been issued at
nearly every level of the Department of Defense (DoD). For the longest time, the guidance
was deferred to each installation commander or relied on existing vague guidance from
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other communities such as public affairs, operations security, or communications. No one
policy or guidance lends assurance to geospatial data security and information sharing,
each is interwoven and at times leaves room for interpretation or are contradictory. Even
within the Air Force, the major commands, wings and squadrons differences exist in the
way these documents are interpreted. Many installations have developed their own local
policies to address their needs. Now, multiply these differences every time organizational
leadership boundaries are crossed or as leadership within organizations change.
Problems exist beyond the initial guidelines. For example, whose authority is it to
change or restrict data? Is it different for each data layer? Who is to say that the data is
useful for planning and executing an attack? The yes / no decisions are not as simple as the
decision tree presents. Until organizations have a mutual level of understanding on how to
make the complex qualitative decisions required for safeguarding information, there will
continue to be added challenges. We are getting better, but there is still much work to do.
The latest draft security policies, currently being vetted through the Air Force do much to
help focus past inconsistencies. More than anything, having the conversation about security
concerns and the need to share information is most important. The more information we
can share on the challenges of security, the more we will be able to understand the problem
and can begin to develop solutions to incorporate both in policy and in practice.
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III. Methodology
Purpose and Organization
There are many ways in which research can be conducted, research methods such as
experiments, surveys, archival analysis, case studies, and historical research are like tools
in a carpenter’s toolbox and the researcher must intelligently choose the most useful
research tool from the toolbox to get the job done. Choosing the wrong tool could lead to
criticism of the conclusions. Worse yet, selecting the wrong methodology wastes time in
finding the answers to the researcher’s problem. In developing a research strategy it is
important to understand what tools are available and how they work to answer the
questions. This chapter discusses the approach to developing the methodology to provide
the best way to answer the research questions, the value of the case study research strategy,
and why an exploratory case study is the best approach for this research.
Developing the Research Strategy
Robert Yin, a respected researcher and expert in applied social science research
methods, suggests that researchers should select strategies based off three situational
factors “(a) the type of research question posed [the “who”, “what”, “where”, “how”, and
“why” questions], (b) the extent of control an investigator has over actual behavioral
events, and (c) the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events” (Yin,
2003:5). Figure 8 represents the basic research strategies that one can select from based
upon the situational factors in the research.
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Strategy Form of Research Question
Experiment how, why?

Requires Control of
Behavioral Events?

Focuses on
Contemporary
Events?

Yes

Yes

Survey

who, what, where,
how many, how much?

No

Yes

Archival Analysis

who, what, where,
how many, how much?

No

Yes/No

History how, why?

No

No

Case Study how, why?

No

Yes

Figure 8. Relevant Situations for Different Research Strategies (Yin, 2003:5)
Based upon this taxonomy of research strategies, the characteristics of this research are
reviewed to determine which research methodology to employ. In this research, the form
of research questions have taken on the form of “How and why questions are more
explanatory and likely to lead to the use of case studies, histories, and experiments as the
preferred research strategies” (Yin, 2003:6). This helped further lead the research in the
direction of a case study.
The Extent of Control
This research has very little or no control over the actual behavioral events. The
researcher cannot manipulate any of the behaviors or decisions and is far enough removed
from the context of the organizations to exert any influence on the outcomes of the study.
The experiment is the only strategy that requires the control of behavior. There is currently
not enough data or knowledge to set up a controlled experiment regarding this complicated
subject.
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The Degree of Focus
The third factor in considering selection of research strategy is the degree of focus
on contemporary as opposed to historical events. Although it is important to understand
the history and reasons why decisions were made, the research intent is to understand the
contemporary events found with in the Air Force community. The nature of the problem in
itself is contemporary, as the Air Force has never faced the extent of these challenges
brought about by technology and culture.
Considering these situational factors, the researcher’s conclusion was that the best
tool to tackle the intricacies of these research objectives is the case study method.
Case Study Research
The case study is one of many strategy tools for the researcher and has three basic
purposes: explanation, description, and exploration. “Doing a good case study is more than
just looking at what is happening in a few instances. It is a special systematic way of
looking at what is happening, of selecting the instances, collecting the data, analyzing the
information, and reporting the results” (Datta, 1990:23). A case study is useful for learning
about complex circumstances and is the preferred strategy “when the investigator has little
control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some
real-life context” (Yin, 2003:1). In this particular case, since GeoBase is relatively a new
concept for the Air Force and has not been researched, applying case study strategy will
help to contribute to the body of knowledge on the technical and cultural aspects of
geospatial information systems. Learning how GeoBase fits into the greater context of
security and sharing is the goal of this case study research.
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There are three predominant types of case study research: explanatory, descriptive
and exploratory case studies. The conditions of the study will again dictate which type of
case study is most appropriate. The explanatory is used to explain a course of events,
whereas the descriptive study aims at presenting a complete description or overview of a
phenomenon within a certain context. In exploring the possibilities, the exploratory case
study must both be able to explain and describe in order to have an in-depth understanding
of the different aspects involved. Sometimes it is necessary to explore questions and reach
beyond the surface to develop measurement constructs for further research.
Why an Exploratory Case Study?
The exploratory case study is the most useful for evaluating programs where
uncertainty exists and is designed to assist in the development of future evaluation
questions, elements of measure, and new strategies. Before investing in costly
investigations, an exploratory case study can help pin point areas which may provide
greater returns on investments in both time and money. An exploratory case study helps to
narrow the scope of future research so that it yields greater understanding and a logical
place to start (Datta, 1990:40). Case studies are the perfect tool, “aimed at defining the
questions and hypotheses of a subsequent study or determining the feasibility of the desired
research procedures” (Yin, 2003).
Case Study Design
This research employs a single-case with multiple units of analysis. This embedded
type of design was selected for several reasons. First, its unique ability to be representative
of the how geospatial information is treated in the military and “to capture the
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circumstances and conditions of an everyday or common situation” in the Air Force (Yin,
2003:41). Another reason behind this rationale is that this particular case is revelatory,
meaning that there has been relatively current changes in technology and the limited time
and opportunity for researchers to study these newly raised problems. A third advantage to
the single-case study is that this will help to set a benchmark identifying issues and current
processes that may aid in future longitudinal studies that can help compare two points in
time (Yin, 2003:42). The main unit of this case study is the US Air Force GeoBase
community as a whole. The embedded units of the headquarters element, different major
commands (MAJCOMs), the relationship to joint services and other customers will be
important to consider. Depending on the level of analysis required on each embedded
element, different data collection techniques will be used in order to enhance what is found
in the single case environment.
The framework to support this single-case (embedded) method is threefold: 1)
define and design, 2) prepare, collect, & analyze, and 3) analyze and conclude. These next
sections will discuss the requirements, suitability, and selection of the case design.
Step 1: Define and Design
The initial stage of this research sets the foundation and direction for this case study
(see Figure 9 below). There are three sub stages important to understand before continuing
into the rest of the research: 1) develop research questions, 2) select context and case, and
3) define what are to be the units of analysis and design protocol for data collection.
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Figure 9. Single-Case Study (embedded) Method - Phase 1 (Yin, 2003:50)

Developing the Research Questions
In the first stage, a specific definition of the problem helps to establish boundaries
and reign in what type of case selection would be the most helpful in answering those
questions. In this research, the question focuses on seeking an understanding of
information security and information sharing processes of geospatial information in the US
Air Force GeoBase program.
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Context and Case Selection
The context of the case becomes clearer as we better understand what it is we want
to accomplish. The context and case of the GeoBase program office within the Air Force
seems a natural case selection in the quest to find how we can get the most out of our
GeoBase provided geospatial information while maintaining security (see Figure 10
below).

CONTEXT:
Info Security & Information Sharing

Case: USAF GeoBase
USAF
MAJCOMs

HQ AF

Base Level
GIOs

Joint
Services

Policies &
Guidance

GeoBase
Consumers

Figure 10. Case Study Design
Defining the Units of Analysis
Defining the units of analysis and designing the data collection protocol becomes
the third biggest decision in setting up this research. This research could take many
directions dependent on the selection of the context and case. For instance, we could have
chosen to look at one particular major command or a specific unit. Likewise, we could
have broadened our context and broadened our scope to look at the entire Department of
Defense. Perhaps, these may be areas of interest for future research. The focus of the
primary research questions help to dictate what the appropriate unit of analysis should
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become. Instead, it seemed more appropriate to include in the exploration the entire US
Air Force GeoBase program and examine the entire organization, from the Air Staff down
to the unit level, as the unit of analysis.
Data Collection Protocol
Designing the data collection protocol further commits the focus of the research
down a path, where we hope to find the most useful tools and evidence to develop answers
to the complex research questions. Yin discusses three principles case study researchers
should follow to help deal with problems of validity and reliability (Yin, 2003:85). These
three principles: “(a) using multiple, not just single sources of evidence; (b) creating a case
study database; and (c) maintaining a chain of evidence” are particularly important to the
collection of data in case study research (Yin, 2003:85). In this section, we will examine
these three principles and explain their importance in the development of this research’s
investigative protocol, identified in Appendix A.
Using Multiple Sources of Evidence
Therefore, the case data collection protocol for this research was established with
both these principles and requirements of the human subjects review board in mind.
Within the context of the questions, traces of evidence had to be found in order to
corroborate converging ideas. Yin cites six sources of evidence (see Table 1) and offers
insight into their different strengths and weaknesses to consider when building supports for
the case database.
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Table 1. Six Sources of Evidence: Strengths and Weaknesses
Source of Evidence

Strengths

Weaknesses

Documentation &
Archival Records

• Stable – can be reviewed
repeatedly
• Unobtrusive – not created as a
result of the case study
• Exact – contains exact names,
references, and details of an
event
• Broad coverage – long span of
time, many events, and many
settings
• Precise and quantitative

• Retrievability – can be low
• Biased selectivity, if collection
is incomplete
• Reporting bias – reflects
(unknown) bias of author
• Access – may be deliberately
blocked
• Accessibility due to privacy
reasons

Interviews

• Targeted – focuses directly on
case study topic
• Insightful – provides perceived
causal inferences

• Bias due to poorly constructed
questions
• Response bias
• Inaccuracies due to poor recall
• Reflexivity – interviewee gives
what interviewer wants to hear

Direct Observations

• Reality – covers events in real
time
• Contextual – covers context of
events

• Time-consuming
• Selectivity – unless broad
coverage
• Reflexivity – event may proceed
differently because it is being
observed
• Cost – hours needed by human
observers

Participant Observation

• (same as direct observations)
• Insightful into interpersonal
behavior and motives

• (same as direct observations)
• Bias due to investigator’s
manipulation of events

Physical Artifacts

• Insightful into cultural features
• Insightful into technical
operations

• Selectivity
• Availability

(Yin, 2003:86)
Creating the Case Study Database
These sources of evidence are weighed against the nature of the case selected and
begin to become the supporting structures in the construction of the case database. This
section will examine how the case study database will be populated, as noted in Figure 11.
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Archival Records
Web Statistics

Policy Documents

CASE DATABASE
SME Focus Interviews
with GIOs

Observations
(Direct & Participant)

Customer Interview

Figure 11. Building the Case Study Database

Subject Matter Expert (SME) Focus Interviews
The case study interviews were not selected at random, but rather with careful
consideration for the level of expertise, experience, and recognition as subject matter
experts (SME). Those interviewed represented a combination of military and civilian
leaders/managers perspective that have primary responsibilities for GeoBase program. The
interviews were spread across different commands of the Air Force GeoBase Community.
Interviews were conducted between the October 2006 and February 2007 timeframe.
Interviews were conducted over the phone. As per the human subjects review board
exemption requirements, no identifying information obtained from the survey information
or through interviews will be recorded, retained or reported in the final thesis. This is to
protect individual’s data from being disclosed outside the research setting so that it could
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not be interpreted or used in such a way which would be damaging to the subject's financial
standing, employability, or reputation. The formal interview protocol can be found in
Appendix B.
Interview questions were developed and organized by the following common
security categories: Administrative, Logical / Technical, and Physical controls, and further
defined in Table 2.
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Table 2. Common Control Categories
Control Category
Administrative

Description
Policies and procedures
designed to enforce security
rules

Example
- Hiring practices
- Usage monitoring and accounting
- Security awareness training
- Data Sensitivity Matrices
- Risk Assessment
- Planning
- System and Services Acquisition
- Certification, Accreditation, and
Security Assessments

Object access restrictions
- User identification and
implemented through the use
authentication
of software or hardware
- Encryption
- Segregated network architecture
- Personnel Security
- Physical and Environmental
Protection
- Contingency Planning
- Configuration Management
- Maintenance
- System and Information Integrity
- Media Protection
- Incident Response
- Awareness and Training
Physical access to hardware - Identification and Authentication
limited
- Access Control
- Fences
- Walls
- Locked doors
- Audit and Accountability
- System and Communications
Protection
derived from (Solomon and Chapple, 2005; Swanson, Hash, and Bowen, 2006.)

Logical / Technical

Physical

These categories lead to the arrangement of the different questions guiding the interview
discussion.
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Policy Documents
Policy documents are physical evidence and can be used to help corroborate
information from other sources and triangulate in on situational facts (Yin, 2003:87).
These documents play a key role in evaluating the current expected business practices
policy makers place on organizations to drive actions towards information security and
information sharing. An examination of the Air Force policies and their timeline regarding
the GeoBase program may provide insight into patterns or causes of practices that help or
hinder the intent. As this research will further discuss in chapters four and five, how the
organization chooses to construct, interpret, and implement policy will lead to certain
actions and responses from the affected organizations. The strength, weaknesses, or lack of
policy all together will influence the program’s behavior. The final analysis will
incorporate what was found in this exploratory case study. Appendix F lists the relevant
policies and guidance documents found in this research.
Archival Records
Very similar to the documentation of policy documents, archival records are often
seen in the form of service records, organizational records (charts and budgets), maps and
charts, lists, survey data, and personal records (calendars, phone lists, memorandums) (Yin,
2003:89). Any archival records found will be used to help support and lend further
credibility to the chain of evidence.
Customer Interviews
As we study the geospatial information processes, particularly in the GeoBase
environment, it is important to recognize the customer, whom receives the final benefit.
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Hammer and Champy describe processes as “...a collection of activities that takes one or
more kinds of input and creates an output that is of value to the customer” (Hammer and
Champy, 2003). If part of the primary goal of this research is to “maximize USAF mission
processes and minimize customer inefficiencies”, then it becomes very important to
understand our customer’s perspective as we form opinions and policy. This research will
consider a few key customers in the GeoBase process, but will not have time to exhaust the
list of many who receive value from receiving geospatial information.
Observations
By being aware of the things that are happening around oneself is made in part to
the observations that take place. “Such observations serve as yet another source of
evidence in a case study” (Yin, 2003:92). Observations of how geospatial information
systems (GIS) work can be invaluable at understanding the technologies being used and the
problems or limitations that might be encountered (Yin, 2003:93).

Web Statistics
Although statistics may be grouped as a type of archival records, in this case, there
was enough of a distinction to try to find usage statistics of the web servers from each of
the primary GeoBase / GeoReach web servers. Using the web statistics from each of the
commands may help in understanding who the primary customers are; where, when, and
what they are using geospatial information for; and it there are any patterns or outliers that
may help to streamline their user experience and reduce risks to the information. Although
this information may be helpful, there were difficulties in collecting such information. As
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web statistics become more prevalent and more appropriate metrics are used and
understood, this information will become more useful in the future. Some basic
information, which could be shared, was discussed in the interviews.
Maintaining a Chain of Evidence
In order to ensure that the case database maintains its reliability, everything that
goes into the case database must be from reliable evidence. To help ensure reliability of
the database, the third principle of maintaining a chain of evidence was employed. This
“chain of evidence” helps to link the case study questions to the final case study report
through the protocol, citations to sources, and the integrity of the case study database.
What is desired is that the research has “been able to move from one part of the case study
process to another, with clear cross-referencing to methodological procedures and the
resulting evidence” (Yin, 2003:105). The ability for the research audience to trace
evidence up and down the chain will strengthen the conclusions of the research.
Step 2: Prepare, Collect, and Analyze
The second stage of this research builds upon the foundations set in the first stage
by preparing, collecting, and analyzing that which was laid out in the definition and design
of the protocol. This phase consists of two basic actions, conduct and write the embedded
analysis, and is repeated for each identified unit of analysis, as identified below in Figure
12.
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Figure 12. Single-Case Study (embedded) Method - Phase 2.(Yin, 2003:50)

Conducting Units of Analysis
Conducting each unit of analysis would draw upon the data collection protocol,
which taps into all the sources of evidence that could be found. In this case, knowing that
with these particular research questions and the nature of the organization the data would
come primarily from conducting personal interviews with leaders in the field who had a
good understanding and reputation in their areas of experience and expertise. Conducting
this type of personal investigation would lean heavily on the understanding of the following
five basic investigative skills: 1) question asking, 2) listening, 3) being adaptive and
flexible, 4) grasp of the issues being studied, and 5) lack of bias (Yin, 2003:59).
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This case study has been developed to include six embedded units of analysis
within the case of the USAF GeoBase program and make up the different aspects of the
GeoBase program that may be of interest of information security and information sharing.
They are:
1) Headquarters’ Air Force (HQAF)
2) USAF Major Commands (MAJCOMs)
3) Base Level GeoBase Integration Offices (GIOs)
4) Joint Services
5) Policies & Guidance
6) GeoBase Consumers

Methods of Analysis
Once we obtain the data for each of the individual units of analysis, a crossfunctional analysis will take place. This research will employ three techniques,
recommended by the GAO Case study Guidance, to take and analyze the data, in an
attempt to make out what it might mean. The first technique will be to pool together all the
different sources of evidence, across the entire case database, from interviews,
observations, documents, and policies for an extensive or “thick” analysis. (Datta,
1990:20). The second technique will be to analyze the data through triangulation, or as Yin
describes as “convergence of evidence” (Yin, 2003:100). By identifying matching patterns
or themes may be useful in building explanations. The third technique employed will be
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the comparison of evidence for consistency. Depending on the type of data found, a
categorical matrix, charts, graphs, tables, or timelines may help to substantiate conclusions.
Writing the Embedded Analysis Report
Conducting each unit of analysis would draw upon the data collection protocol, in
which the written report will be in the traditional question-answer narrative format. With
as many research questions posed from the beginning, it seems logical to follow through
with the same organization style. Yin notes advantages of this style as “a reader need only
examine the answers to the same question or questions within each case study to begin
making cross-case comparisons. Because each reader may be interested in different
questions, the entire format facilitates the development of a cross-case analysis tailored to
the specific interests of its readers” (Yin, 2003:148). “A series of questions can be posed,
with the answers taking some reasonable length…and can contain all the relevant evidence
and can be augmented with tabular presentations and citations” (Yin, 2003:148).
Step 3: Analyze and Conclude
The third and final stage of this research methodology consists of taking everything
that we set out to learn in the first stage and what we discovered in the second stage and
process the ideas and knowledge into something new (see Figure 13 below).
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Figure 13. Single-Case Study (embedded) Method - Phase 3 (Yin, 2003:50)
This stage often is just the beginning of new questions and new theories. As
conclusions are drawn and the original theory modified, these new understandings will
enable us to make better-educated decisions about the subject in the future, such as new
policies and guidance or focus for funding. This is why it is important to capture these
conclusions, theories, and implications into a written report to communicate this new
understanding to others with similar and overlapping interests and questions.
This third step will begin to manifest itself in chapter four, where the discussion
will be directed at answering the primary research questions, drawing conclusions from the
case database, and developing an idea of what kind of implications may be drawn from the
findings. There are five general characteristics of exemplary case studies and are measures
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of how this report will be gauged. These five characteristics are that the case study must 1)
be significant, 2) be complete, 3) consider alternative perspectives, 4) display significant
evidence, and 5) be composed in an engaging manner (Yin, 2003:160).

Potential Pitfalls
Limitations, strengths and weaknesses are inherent in all types of research. The
purpose of this section is to present the boundaries of the research and so that the reader
may understand where these potential pitfalls may lie. There are three main categories
which will be examined; “those relating to the researcher himself, those related to the
researcher’s perspective of the subject matter, and those related to the data being collected
by the case study researcher” (West, 2006:155). Some researchers warn of the temptation
to spend too much time on the exploratory phase of research or do not cast a wide enough
net either out of convenience or because the exploration does not cover the problem
adequately. In addition, it may be too early to begin exploring, thus understand the
maturity level of the program or organization is essential. There have also been instances
where the researcher becomes over involved and the research only seeks to confirm
personal views rather than test them. Another caution is that sometimes case study
evidence does not pan out the way in which it was originally thought and can potentially
change the case. It is important to investigate all possible concerns prior to committing to a
particular case to avoid misrepresentation (Yin, 2003:42). Table 3 summarizes the
potential pitfalls of case study research.
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Table 3. Summary of Potential Pitfalls
Pitfalls

Researcher

Limitations, Strengths and/or Weaknesses
• Adequate exploration / investigation
• Over involvement
• Personal bias
• Researcher’s assumptions
• Competency
• Expertise (Grasp of the issues being studied)
• Ability to adapt to situations
• Flexible
• Influences
• Judgment & Intuition
• Investigative Skills
o Interview/question asking
o Listening
o Note taking
o Data collecting

Subject Matter
Perspective

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Subject complexities
Context (What’s happening around the subject)
Richness and detail
Technical skill requirements
Breadth and depth
Experience
Understanding of subject
Knowledge of patterns and causes

Data

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Reliability
Commitment (length & time)
Captures context
Interpretation
Lack of variety of data types
Number of variable and data points
Qualitative
Objectivity
Verifiability
Comparability
Quality control
Impartiality
Relationship between data collected and research question
Publication basis may severely limit generalization
Inadequate or uncertain quality of original data
Inadequate methods of relating findings
Quality of data-reduction procedures may be very difficult to
determine the effects of changes in many contextual factors over
time may be difficult to separate from effects of the programs
Insufficient attention to management and data reduction
Inefficiency, lateness, incomplete use of data

•
•

derived from (West, 2006:155) and (Yin, 2003)
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Summary of Methodology
This chapter discussed the approach taken in the development of the research
methodology, designed to provide the most appropriate way to answer the research
questions. Research into different methodologies led to the case study research method due
to the contemporaneous nature of the subject. Since focus on geospatial information has
primarily been focused on the creation and application of the data, we are just beginning to
explore the ramifications of this newly applied technology and the way we share and secure
information. The exploratory case study method was the best way to learn more to
positively impact the future direction of the field. This chapter also has discussed the three
steps of the case study design and walked through how this research effort has been defined
and designed, data preparation, collection and analysis, and sets the stage for the outcomes
and conclusions that will be found in the following chapters.
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IV. Analysis
The purpose of this chapter is to present the case database and bring about a better
understanding to the six primary research questions set forth in chapter one. The research
is comprised of an exploratory case study that involves multiple interviews, collection of
policy, memorandums, and guidance documents, as well as GeoBase conference papers
and presentations, as discussed in chapter three. Analysis of the case database will be
presented using a question-answer narrative format. The primary research question will be
presented and answers will draw on all available sources of evidence from the developed
case database.

PG1 What is the nature of the security risk posed by GeoBase?
As in the literature review, the nature of the security risk posed by military
geospatial information, like that which the GeoBase program office manages, is not any
different from other types of geospatial information. However, the information being
produced for the garrison and expeditionary installation equate to details of the Air Force’s
primary war-fighting weapon system. Air Force installations can be considered more like a
naval aircraft carrier rather than an Army installation, for the air base is the platform from
which the Air Force mission is won. Just as the details of the strengths and weaknesses of
the aircraft carrier would be protected, so too should the details of the Air Force
installation. With as many airmen, civil servants, contractors, and dependents that are a
part of each installation, it becomes increasingly difficult and easier to forget this is a warfighting platform, not a place of business or the neighborhood around the corner. Military
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installations face different threats and have their individual vulnerabilities. Together, they
create risks to the system and people operating that system.
What are the geospatial assets in need of protection?
Four primary groups make up the geospatial data assets that the information
security programs seek to protect. They include, 1) the geospatial data itself, including all
vector, raster, associated attribute tables, and metadata; 2) the software applications that
power the GIS capabilities; 3) the installation network capabilities which provide
accessibility to the information, to include the Air Force portal; and 4) the GIS products
themselves, such as maps, websites, videos, and reports. (Lachman, 2006).
What are the top security concerns of GeoBase today?
To understand the nature of the GeoBase security risks, let us first identify the
primary problems found in this field (see Table 4 below). Several interesting discussions
emerged as the top issues, which include:
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Table 4. GeoBase’s Primary Security Concerns

Primary Security
Concerns
1. Awareness of
vulnerabilities and
threats (risks)

Security
Control
Family

Description
With many, the many unknowns about the vulnerabilities
and threats to geospatial information drive fears that link
to a managerial instinct to “turn it off” or hide it. These
fears impede potentially useful information from making
it into the hands of those who can make the most from it.
Information users don’t realize the value and how careful
we need to be with geospatial data
People are not familiar with the different threats and
vulnerabilities to the system and information. In many
cases they are unknown

AWARENESS
TRAINING
&
RISK
ASSESSMENT

Maps and information are becoming commonplace and
people and INFOSEC and OPSEC

2. Classification
determination of
aggregated
information (policy
and business
process)

No process in place to determine classification of data
layers
The more we combine data, the higher the risks. Comm
has a good understanding of that as they have
traditionally placed more security on their comm. data
than CE has ever put on our utility data.
As we compile layers of information together, what
makes it classified and what does not? Where is the
policy that says whether it is classified or not and who is
to say what classify level that information is. To date
Intel (or each stovepipe) does their stuff, but as far as the
agile combat support world, they do not touch it.

3. Access Policy

This is all very dynamic process as we are constantly
developing new data and information, as well as adding
and combining (weave or braid) this information
together. Reviewing and monitoring these aggregated
maps are a challenge with no standard policy or process
in place.
Information systems are opening up broader access to so
many more people than in the past. Before you had to
go and ask for copies of the base map tabs from CE, now
that information is provided straight to your desktop with
no questions asked. Although, this is not a bad thing, it
is something to be aware of as the program continues to
develop and business practices are laid through policy.
Individual data stewards are on their own to determine
need to know.
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RISK
ASSESSMENT
&
ACCESS
CONTROL

ACCESS
CONTROL

4. Release of data to
contractors / nongovernment entities

5. Improper or
unauthorized
access to critical
infrastructure or
security data.

Contractors do not have access to the network of
information that they must have to do the work required
of them (design / construction). CDs of information are
handed over to contractors with nothing more than a
clause in the contract agreement saying that they will
destroy or return all data when the job is complete.
However, once the information walks out the door, there
is no control over it. Often not considered are the
security policies, networks, and practices of the offices
of both the contractors and subcontractors hired to work
on the projects.
Organizations making data publicly available without
going through appropriate channels.
Foreign release to foreign governments without access to
our secure systems. (GCCS, COIN, etc). This is a major
gray area in what and how to share with allied
governments.

ACCESS
CONTROL

ACCESS
CONTROL
&
ID AUTH
&
PERSONAL
SECURITY
SYSTEMS &
SERVICES

What Security Controls are available?
In exploring what types of risk that GeoBase geospatial information poses on to this warfighting system, three primary classes of risk were found that could be controlled (see
Table 5):
Table 5. Primary Security Controls
Control Type
Technical

Managerial
Operational

Description
“those aspects of the computer system which define
security requirements for the applications and assist
in detecting violations to prevent unauthorized
access or misuse
which focus on the management controls and
element of managing risk
the way managerial and technical decisions are put
into operation and are mostly people driven versus
system driven” (Swanson et al, 2006:25).

After reviewing the literature on information security, there was a noticeable connection in
what was being discussed in the interviews, which spanned the experience from the
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different levels of the GeoBase organization, to that which federal information system
security experts have begun to examine. It is clear that the problems and concerns of the
GeoBase program is experiencing fits well into the families of security control categories
as identified in the Guide for Developing Security Plans for Federal Information Systems
(Swanson et al, 2006.) and the recently released special publication of Recommended
Security Controls for Federal Information Systems (Ross et al, 2006) (see Table 6 below).
Table 6. Security Control Classes and Families (Swanson et al, 2006)
Class
Technical
Technical
Technical
Technical
Operational
Operational
Operational
Operational
Operational
Operational
Operational
Operational
Operational
Management
Management
Management
Management

Control Family Name
Identifier
Access Control
AC
Audit and Accountability
AU
Identification and Authentification
IA
System and Communication Protection
SC
Awareness Training
AT
Configuration Management
CM
Contingency Planning
CP
Incident Response
IR
Maintenance
MA
Media Protection
MP
Personnel Security
PS
Physical and Environmental Protection
PE
System and Information Integrity
SI
Certification, Accrediation, and Security Assements
CA
Planning
PL
Risk Assessment
RA
Systems and Services Acquisition
SA

The identified seventeen security control families were similar to the areas of highrisk areas identified in the interviews of the case study database. Organizing the top topics
found in the case study database by security control family reveals the primary areas of
risk. Identifying these security control factors, researchers are able to begin to provide
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guidance and develop metrics for mapping different types of information and information
security categories.
What are the ways in which GeoBase offices are controlling information today?
The GeoBase offices rely on two separate systems and their ability to maintain an
appropriate level of information assurance. If any piece of information is classified, then it
is separated out and stored on the SIPRNet classified system. The Secret Internet Protocol
Router Network (SIPRNET) is the primary network for U.S. only secret-level (SECRETNOFORN) data. Unclassified information is controlled on the NIPRNet, “the Unclassified
but Sensitive Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNet) provides seamless
interoperability for unclassified combat support applications, as well as controlled access to
the Internet” (DISA, 2006). Today, each of these systems, access is restricted primarily by
the smart military identification card, known as the Common Access Card (CAC). These
cards “store 64KB of data storage and memory on a single integrated circuit chip (ICC).
This CAC technology allows for rapid authentication and enhanced security for all physical
and logical access. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) certificates embedded in the card
enable cardholders to “sign” documents digitally, encrypt emails, and establish secure
online network connections” (Department of Defense). CAC Cards can only be issued
after the following physical background checks have been accomplished:
•

“A SF-86 Form has been completed and submitted to the appropriate Personnel
Security Representative

•

A Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) fingerprint check has been completed and
approved
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•

A National Agency Check with Inquiries (NACI)* background security check is in
the process of being completed” (Department of Defense).
Access to the common installation pictures (CIPs), once provided directly from

MAJCOM GeoBase servers, and now are made available via the Air Force Portal, where
users must have an Air Force Portal account and CAC login. At the installations, beyond
the CIP, further access restrictions are put on the GeoBase service depending on the data
and functional owner of that data and purpose of the mapping service. For example, the
integrated base defense viewer, communications viewer, anti-terrorism force protection
viewer, are limited at the service level and limited to only authorized users on the network
as determined by the owning organization’s data steward. For the majority of the GeoBase
customers, access is granted via CAC login.
Base maps have been accessible over the Air Force Portal and base local networks
(intranets) before CAC technology was available and GIOs relied on local password
control systems and access from a .mil account, which allowed the GIO to limit access to
the system. Access control lists are cumbersome and difficult to maintain. Someone is
required to maintain an access database, which then ties to ArcIMS, that contains a list of
separate login names and passwords. This database resides on a server with its own
inherent vulnerabilities. As users come and go or Ops tempo increases, this list is difficult
to maintain and is not as secure as it could be. Other ways of restricting access, though not
necessarily a security measure, was to assign an obscure URL address that helps in
decreasing traffic to the site. Over the last few years, the need for control has grown.
Since much of the initial data that was being collected were internal to the civil engineering
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organization, it was much easier to control and know who needed what and why. As the
need and collection of data has expanded beyond the civil engineering center of gravity,
there is an increased need for new controls measures.
As policies and technology have enabled the standard CAC identification tools, PKI
certificates, and combined with the advantages of the portal’s active directory controls for
network logins and passwords, the GeoBase leaders are better assured their information is
making into trusted hands. GeoBase is becoming more integrated into the Portal and using
the Portal access manager, which allow for the same tools that Portal is using now to
govern who gets access to what and trickles down to the layer and attribute levels. This
allows GeoBase administrators to begin to more efficiently customize access to any part of
the information. Now, instead of giving someone access to the entire geodatabase,
administrators can fine-tune access, providing only the knowledge required. For example,
it could allow someone who is getting ready to dig in an area the ability to see that there is
a utility line in the way, but would not disclose the attribute details of the utility line, such
as if it is a T1 or T5 communications line, classified, unclassified, or what facilities it
services.
By CAC authentification and setting up a user group policies defined by data
stewards, or subject matter experts (SMEs), and controlled by active directory group
policies using the CAC certificate. Each SME tells the GIO who needs to be included in
those groups. Most commands make available what information is available, but do not
provide access unless the data steward, responsible for that data grants the GIO permission
to provide access. Data not available provides contact information on how and who
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authorization is needed. Each individual data steward determines the requestor’s need to
know, then advises the GIO on who to allocate permissions and for how long. Based on
the web solution, it is possible to lock down individual features and/or attribute layers.
MAJCOMs are testing a more robust “Secure Map” application (beta test being
worked), to be used to help restrict access on the portal by CAC logon down to the layer
and attribute level. For example, if you are in security forces and have a security forces
role (need to know), then when you log on with your CAC card, you will be able to see all
data and attributes defined as of interest to security forces, perhaps it is security camera
locations, access routes, entry control points, or other type of information in the security
forces mission data set (MDS). However, if you are not part of that role, then you can only
see the CIP and will not have access the other information. In this case, the owner of the
information must assign roles and define access limitations. These limitations are set using
either individual ids or associated group settings, just like email groups such as “SRC
members” or “Command Post Personnel”.
CAC controls such as these help add layers of security onto the installation’s basic
three-tiered firewall system that are set up to limit users to: 1) base only personnel, 2)
MAJCOM domain only, or 3) .mil only. Users with .mil access cover the widest range of
access to GeoBase information, the CIP.
Security controls for the web-based side of providing information are completely
different from the non-web based networks for the more savvy GIS user. These users tend
to work directly off the hard drive space, memory stick, CD/DVD, and with paper copies.
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How they manage security is different from how security is managed for the web-based
networks.
The nature of the security risks associated with GeoBase is multifaceted and
complex, just like risks other information systems face. Geospatial information is to the
installation as your personal finance information is to you. Just as someone can do damage
with the information of your bank account, they too can do damage knowing critical
information about the base. It is important to safeguard the information, but as in business,
if you want to get paid account information must be shared. Sure, there is an element of
trust, but we understand the risks and the safeguards in place for our finances. We must
come to understand the technical, operational, and managerial security aspects of the
geospatial information with which we work.

PG2 What information is sensitive that poses a risk to security?
This question is one that continues to plague the experts. The sensitivity of
information depends directly with the capabilities that a piece of knowledge of information
opens up to someone with access. Things have become so much more common and
available to the public through multiple media outlets, especially the in the use of the
internet. So much of our environment that was once limited knowledge, like information
about our installations, now have expanded beyond a limited community network and into
public domain where anyone can access this information. This is why it has become
increasingly more important for us to identify and control information early on that needs
to remain in a protected environment. “Identifying data sensitivity is critical for
determining the security controls that should be used to protect the connected systems and
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the data” (Grance, Hash, Peck, Smith, and Korow-Diks, 2002:3-3). As the GeoBase
community continues to collect and consolidate information, they do so under the same
guidelines that they have been familiar to them in the past. Under this question, it is also
important to explore how geospatial information is currently being classified, who defines
the classification of this information, what type of information are considered sensitive, and
how security information is being tracked in the GIS system.
How is geospatial information classified?
Currently, information is categorized into two main levels of classification, based
on the individual merits of the information as either Classified or Unclassified. However,
information that is unclassified is routed into one of three subcategories: 1) Sensitive, but
Unclassified, 2) Unclassified, For Official Use Only (FOUO), or 3) Unclassified, Public
Information (FOIA). “The fact that this guide indicates that some information may be
unclassified does not imply that that information is automatically releasable to the public.
Unclassified information…intended for public release must be reviewed for sensitivity and
processed through appropriate channels for approval in accordance with DoD Instruction
5230.9, "Clearance of DoD Information for Public Release””(Stenbit, 2003).
“Classification is reserved for specific categories of information or the compilation of
related information as defined in Executive Order 12958” (Stenbit, 2003). GeoBase is
quickly falling into this gray area of classification by compilation and to date has not been
determined as classified, as most compilations are not. “However, in certain
circumstances, information that would otherwise be marked UNCLASSIFIED may become
classified when combined or associated with other UNCLASSFIED information, if the
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compiled information reveals an additional association or relationship. See DoD Regulation
5200.1-R. Under such circumstances, it is the combination or compilation of information
that is classified, not the individual items of information. Users of this SCG must be aware
of such a possibility when compiling UNCLASSIFIED information. Likewise, the
compilation of classified information must be classified, at a minimum, at the highest
classification within the aggregated data, but may become a higher classification if the
compiled information reveals an additional association or relationship” (Stenbit, 2003).
The graph below (Figure 14) estimates how geospatial information in the GeoBase
program is distributed into these classification categories.

Classification Distribution
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Figure 14. Classification Distribution in GeoBase
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It is important to note that although the level of work being classified as SECRET, the
majority of the information is not imagery or data related, but rather troop locations and
vulnerabilities tied to a specific operation or wartime plan in base support plans. There are
extensive rules, policies, and training on who, what, why, and how long information
becomes classified at the SECRET level. Title 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations, part
2001 provides explicit reasons why information should be classified. This Executive order
“prescribes a uniform system for classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying national
security information. It also establishes a monitoring system to enhance its effectiveness.
This Directive sets forth guidance to agencies on original and derivative classification,
downgrading, declassification, and safeguarding of classified national security
information” (Information Security Oversight Office, 2003). Information falling into any
of the categories below should be considered for a classification decision:
•

“military plans, weapons systems, or operations

•

foreign government information

•

intelligence activities (including special activities), intelligence sources or methods,
or cryptology

•

foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential
sources

•

scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security,
which includes defense against transnational terrorism

•

United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities

•

vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects,
plans, or protection services relating to the national security, which includes defense
against transnational terrorism

•

weapons of mass destruction” (Information Security Oversight Office, 2003).
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However, little has been done to examine and evaluate information that does not
necessarily meet the criteria for the TOP SECRET, SECRET, or CONFIDENTIAL
classified data, but is still sensitive. Wading into the “Sensitive, but Unclassified” waters,
one finds themselves over their head in muddy water. This is one of the biggest challenge
areas the GeoBase program faces in the security of its operations. Especially as the Air
Force continues to become more efficient in organizing their database systems. The power
of organizing information together into one system has changed how the Air Force must
gauge the sensitivity of information as well as how we must work to protect this new type
of aggregated information, which we need to remain widely accessible to those needing the
information. In following questions analysis is provided at some of the impacts and costs
found in restricting access by classifying information.
Three primary major commands produce GeoReach information, which is
expeditionary geospatial information (GeoBase-like) for forward operating locations which
aim to deliver the “one map” for the contingency environment. The remaining commands
depend on this GeoReach information as a customer. Even though so many aspects about
what are associated with deployable locations are classified, the information these
GeoReach maps are derived from are not necessarily classified. For example, if we had a
GeoReach location in Mongolia, it is not necessarily about the data itself, but what the data
implies. You can get the same information off Google Earth or other sources. For this
reason, two of the three commands have posted their GeoReach data on the AF Portal,
giving the same level of attention and detail to each, thus no way to jump to a conclusion
that one is more strategically important. The other command has taken the approach that in
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their command, the implications are too great and do not want conclusions to be made.
Part of the intent of GeoReach is to supply educated troops to the theater. Providing troops
access to the information on the locations they are serving, there are only minute
differences in weather they find it on the SIPRnet, Air Force Portal, or Google Earth.
There are still GeoReach and GeoBase information that will be used to tie classified
information to a location, making it geospatial classified information and required to
operate on the SIPRnet service to those with the appropriate SECRET level clearances.
Who defines the classification of geospatial information?
The data owner/steward of the information currently makes this determination with
the help of the GeoBase administrator. The majority of the GeoBase offices do not deal
with classified information, if they do, then they are not aware of it or it is yet to be
determined. Individually, these mission data layers are classified at the FOUO level.
Right now GeoBase offices are publishing a lot of geospatial information, if something
looks like it should be sensitive, then the data owner is consulted and layer by layer,
solutions are put into place.
The current security practices are an amalgamation of historical documents and
business practices, agreements, policies, processes, and new requests by data stewards and
the data layer owners. Although the GeoBase administrators and data stewards do their
best, they cannot do it in isolation. The Air Force is notorious for allowing decisions to be
made at the base level for the best interest of unique situations at each installation.
However, with decisions on information classification, continuity amongst how
information is to be classified is important across commands and across the service. The
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GeoBase office and data stewards are not the only perspectives that this decision should be
based. Other fields of expertise such as the Opsec, Infosec, and Commsec communities
have valuable expertises that are not currently involved in the process. These
determinations must be made and are the most difficult aspect of applying the technological
controls. Someone has to make the call on who should be allowed to see what.
What types of information is considered sensitive?
As data is collected using the global positioning system (GPS) are tied to points,
lines, and areas to particular places (latitudes and longitudes), within an accuracy of often
less than 1m, in many minds this information can be considered sensitive. Examples of
geospatial type information that may be considered sensitive and in certain cases,
classified:
•
•
•
•
•

•

QD Arcs (Explosive Safety zones)
Crash Grids
AICUZ Contours
Archeological Locations
Critical Infrastructures (Barker, Jun 2004.)
o Agriculture and Food (Including farms and food processing plants)
o Water (Including federal reservoirs and municipal waste water facilities)
o Public Health (Including hospitals and federal health organizations)
o Emergency Services (Including federal, state, and local response units)
o Defense Installations and Defense Industrial Base
o Telecommunications (Including switching and transmission/cable facilities)
o Energy (Including electric, oil, and gas production , transmission facilities)
o Transportation (Aviation, rail, highway, pipelines, maritime, mass transit)
o Banking/Finance (Including federal services and FDIC insured institutions)
o Chemical Industry/Hazardous Materials (e.g., chemical plants)
o Postal and Shipping Facilities
Key Assets (Barker, Jun 2004.)
o Nuclear Power Plants
o National Monuments and Icons
o Dams
o Government Facilities
o Commercial Assets
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•
•
•

Troop locations
Troop movements
Asset allocations
The problem is that in many cases, the data is so readily available, whether the Air

Force has created it or some commercial source creates it. If someone wants coordinates or
any good level of accuracy, they could go to Space Imaging or other commercial site and
find what they are looking for. What makes this palatable are that it is more difficult to
find out which facilities are what, such as command posts, munitions storage, supply
warehouses, etc. However, this type of information is slowly creeping from the private
domain to the more public domain. The interviews expressed there have been incidents
where investigators have had to take maps out of peoples’ hands that they have made or
had unauthorized access to. Examples in a deployed environment have included escorts
finding and confiscating detailed maps from third country nationals (TCNs). Whether they
have acquired it from the trash, find it on base, or have one that they have diagramed out on
their own, pacing off specific details of the installation. It is much easier to point to the
hard copy evidence such as maps found in possession of those without a good need to
know, but as far as the electronic versions of maps and the network, it is much more
difficult to evaluate the magnitude of security incidents.

How is security information tracked in GIS?
All geospatial information has two types of information that is stored and managed
in a relational database management system (RDBMS). The first is information dataset;
this is the primary attribute data table that stores information about each entity. The second
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set of data it stores is data about the data, known as the metadata set. Both datasets store
information about the security classification system and the security classification. In some
instances, there may be a need to identify the primary data as “Unclassified” or “FOUO”
but the metadata may contain information about how the data was collected and is
classified as “Sensitive”. Table 7 is an example of the metadata security information from
the Spatial Data Standards for Facilities, Infrastructure, and Environment (SDSFIE).
Table 7. Tabular Metadata Security Information Template (Headquarters Air Force
Geo Integration Office, April 2006:20)
7.10 Metadata Security Information
7.10.1

Metadata Security
Classification System

The name of the classification
system for the metadata

Valid Value:

7.10.2

Metadata Security
Classification

The name of the handling
restrictions on the metadata.

Valid Values:
“FOUO”
“Unclassified”
“Sensitive”

The Air Force’s standards for the RDBMS data model is defined by the SDSFIE
industry standard which “are developed and maintained by the CADD/GIS Technology
Center for Facilities, Infrastructure, and Environment located in the U.S. Army Engineer
Research and Development Center's Topographic Engineering Office (ERDC TEC) in
Alexandria, VA. The SDSFIE are developed in a collaborative fashion with input from
DoD Services and other Federal organizations” (Headquarters Air Force Geo Integration
Office, 2006).
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PG3 What impacts might information security concerns affect information sharing.
Information sharing remains at the heart of the GeoBase any disruptions or barriers
that affect information sharing will be of impact. Part of this case study was to ascertain if
concerns over information security affects how people share or may not share information.
In order to address this question appropriately, let us first assess if the GeoBase community
has any problems with information sharing. If so, what are they and how is the sense of
security tied to information sharing? Finally, evaluate how these concerns, or perceived
barriers, affect information sharing.
What are the reasons for not sharing?
The research interviews indicated that each organization faced their share of
challenges in establishing relationships that allowed for open exchange of information both
within and between organizations. When asked of the problems they encountered, fear and
the lack of understanding contributed the most to the hesitation to share information. Table
8 indicates the perceived problems for not wanting to share information.
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Table 8. Reasons for not wanting to share information
Areas of Concern

Description

• Lack of understanding typically drives the fear, power, and
control issues.

Ignorance • There are a lot of senior level decision makers and information

controllers who are not familiar with the new information culture,
the capabilities, and potential for both the positive and negative
benefits that can come from sharing information.

• Natural tendencies are to keep a close hold of your data. Many
users are afraid of the data / data quality and if they were to
expose it they would lose control of the data.
• People often fear that their data may not be correct and do not
want others to see that their data is not right.

Fear • Fear of liability
• Similarly, users fear that people won’t understand the intricacies
of their information and develop the wrong conclusions
• Fear of losing either control of their information or the power they
feel the information provides them.
• The old adage knowledge is power still rings true. Some people
consider the data theirs and without it their job or purpose within
Power
the organization will become lessened if they share it.
• At the base level, some data stewards do not want to share data
with those beyond their immediate organizations, often to
Control
maintain decision control over their turf.
• Particularly with sharing regional information picture (RIP) data
and imagery, in the local counties whom have shared information
and imagery through a memorandum of agreement. Often it
comes down to licensing and agreements. We must recognize
Imposed Restrictions
those agreements locally as well, thus motivated not to share
information.
• As connections are made, relatively simple hurdles often stand in
the way of the willingness to share and tend to become excuses
for not wanting to put the effort and energy into what may look to
Compatibility Issues
be more work.
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Figure 15 illustrates as concerns grow, the willingness to share information drops or
that people are more likely to share information when there are few concerns. The areas of
concern are divided out as they were discussed or presented, notice how each are
intertwined.
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Figure 15. Impact of Security Concerns on Information Sharing

As these areas of concern are assessed, one has to consider how fears are fueled or
calmed by the feeling of security. The blanket of security helps users feel secure enough to
release fears or losing control, power, or that something is going to happen to the data. To
overcome these fears and feel more secure about decisions about information, education
has been the only way to combat this problem.
A post 9/11 GAO report to the Secretary of Homeland Security in August of 2003
on efforts to improve information sharing studied ten barriers that were perceived as a
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hindrance to the information sharing process. Figure 16 highlights the ten barriers studied
in the GAO survey and consolidates the average response of 16 federal agencies, 40 state
agencies, 106 large cities, and 122 small cities to give an average percentage of perceived
factors that hinder information sharing (Decker and Lepore, 2003).

10 - Lack of confidence in ability
to manage investigations
1%
9 -Culture of "information
superiority"
1%
8 - Authorities lack interest in
Information to be provided
1%
7 - Concerns about jeopardizing
ongoing investigations
6%
6 - Lack of confidence in ability to
limit disclosure of information
7%

1 - Difficulty with provision to
secure, maintain, and destroy
information
23%

5 - Concerns of disclosing sources
and methods
12%

2 - Lack of clearances
19%
4 - Legal Barriers
12%
3 - Lack of integrated databases
18%

Figure 16. Perceived Barriers Preventing Federal Agencies
from Sharing Information. derived from (Decker and Lepore, 2003)

Although the GAO report identified the lack of integrated database capability as the
only significant barrier, it is interesting to note in Table 9, that the top six out of the ten
barriers studied all have to do with the security of information.
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Table 9. Top Ten Perceived Barriers to Sharing Information (Decker and Lepore,
2003)
1 Difficulty with provision to secure, maintain, and destroy information*
2 Lack of clearances*
3 Lack of integrated databases*
4 Legal Barriers*
5 Concerns of disclosing sources and methods*
6 Lack of confidence in ability to limit disclosure of information*
7 Concerns about jeopardizing ongoing investigations
8 Authorities lack interest in Information to be provided
9 Culture of "information superiority"
10 Lack of confidence in ability to manage investigations*
*

(Directly related to information assurance / information security values)
These emphasize the problems with inconsistencies and different expectations of

information sharing and information security between organizations. Overcoming barriers
such as these will continue to test programs such as the USAF GeoBase program, which
encounters similar challenges when working with internal organizations, joint services,
local municipalities, civilian employees, and private contractors. Each of these groups is
representative of the mission and need pieces of the information the others have to share.
Determining ways to know who it is appropriate to share information with, defining their
“need to know” and how the information will be used are among the difficulties in
establishing consistent procedures.
How is GeoBase overcoming sharing barriers?
The GeoBase program has come a long way very quickly however, we are missing
a lot in the education details. The expectation is that information sharing is also in a life
cycle and willingness will continue to grow as the young company grade officers (CGOs)
and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) grow up with a better understanding in this type of
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open culture. For now, the GeoBase program is in a life cycle stage where there are many
senior leaders and data stewards that do not understand the capabilities of the technology
and potential for both the good and bad.
There are those who do not want information shared in the name of security. The
MAJCOM GIOs are finding that their fears are being curbed they more they know about
the needs to share information and the processes in place to control potential misuse. It is
an education process. Often, the unknowns about security become the scapegoat for not
accepting change. Security cannot be an excuse for not wanting to change. If there is a
map sharing process were leaking and in need of repair, you do not let it continue to leak
the same way it has always been with out doing anything about it. Change is needed. Just
because a new technology is introduced does not mean the broken underlying business
process is fixed. In this case, GIS helped to highlight the problem and focus attention to
the process that needs fixing. For years, maps and information have been walking off the
installations or can be found publicly on the internet without any kind of control
mechanisms in place. Although the perfect solution has not been found, it is better than
what it was. There are inherent problems in the system and to be concerned to the point of
wanting to stop the flow of information now is odd.
Although the Air Force GeoBase policy is to “facilitate sharing GeoBase
knowledge, to the maximum extent allowable, both across and beyond the installation with
other federal, state, or municipal agencies” (Zettler, 2002), the policy is very encompassing
and is difficult to address specific instances. When the inevitable questions arise at the
operational level concerning the release of information and the answer is not necessarily
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clear, the current procedures are to raise the question up the chain of command.
Installation commander have been given the “responsibility to establish protocols for
handling their respective installations’ geospatial information to best satisfy their assigned
missions” (Zettler, 2002). On occasion, data stewards and requestors reach an impasse and
MAJCOM GIOs have become good at stepping in to help mediate the solution. They have
typically found that problems can be resolved by expressing why data cannot be shared or
what needs to be done in order to share the information. Usually, a compromise is reached
with the data owner and still meets the need of the requestor by stripping out data attributes
or specific information. Other times, the MAJCOMs will back the data owner and deny the
request.
GeoBase administrators understand other’s concerns for not wanting to share
information. Just like the GeoBase administrator, they have their concerns about whom
they give their information to and what they are going to do with it. There is a lot more
that can be learned on data sharing from civilian businesses and universities. Pinpointing
these barriers in the military, and how they might be overcome, may be a good topic for
future study.

PG4 What are the key information system security constructs and their
interrelationships?
Information security is so intertwined with the processes, actions, and influences of
so many things contributing to this nebulous concept of “security”. Rather than finding
different aspects of information security specifically associated with geospatial
information, the interviews, literature review, and policy documents all point back to the

82

standard characterizations of information security and the preservation of three particular
constructs: “1) confidentiality, ensuring that information is accessible only to those authorized
to have access; 2) integrity: safeguarding the accuracy and completeness of information and
processing methods; and 3) availability: ensuring that authorized users have access to
information and associated assets when required” (ISO/IEC 17799, 2000). Many, if not all, the
guides and policies for the federal government use these characterizations as their primary
security objectives and are used to extrapolate risk (potential impact). Table 10 shows the
federal information processing standards (FIPS) and how federal information systems, such as
GeoBase, can begin to categorize these security concepts into discrete impact categories into
functions of low, moderate, and high risk.
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Table 10. Potential Impact Definitions of Security Objectives for Categorization
(Barker, 2004; Evans, Bond, and Bement, 2004; Swanson et al, 2006)

These general constructs help to broadly draw direction for Information Security
(INFOSEC) and Operational Security (OPSEC) policies and procedures. However, Table
11 is a compilation different security constructs from multiple courses. As the GeoBase
program continues to reach out and interconnect with other information technology
systems, more security factors must be considered. By no means is this table complete, nor
is it meant to be conclusive of all the important constructs. Instead, it is meant to pull
together different thoughts from a variety of different fields and areas of expertise that

84

relate to the general security of information. All too often, organizations focus on only one
or two aspects of security. As this table shows, multiple aspects must be incorporated into
maintaining security. This table is broken into the primary security requirements of
technical, operational, and management controls as discussed in Table 4.
Table 11. Security Constructs
TECHNICAL CONTROLS
• Access Controls

Access Control Policy;
User Access Management: user registration, password management;
privilege management; review of user access rights; password use;
unattended user equipment
Network Access Control: policy on use of network services; enforced
path; user authentification for external connections; node
authentification; remote diagnostic port protection; segregation in
networks; network connection protocols; network routing control;
security of network services
Operating System Access Control: automatic terminal identification;
terminal log-on procedures; user identification and authorization;
password management system; use of system utilities; duress alarm to
safeguard users; terminal time-out; limitation of connection time.
Application Access Control: information access restrictions; sensitive
system isolation
Monitoring System Access and Use: event logging; monitoring system
use; clock synchronization
Mobile computing and teleworking access controls:
Whether a formal policy is in place, and appropriate security measures
are adopted to protect against the risk of using mobile computing and
communication facilities.
(Thiagarajan, 2003; Thiagarajan, 2005)

• Audit and Accountability
Trails
• Hardware and Systems
Software Requirements

“Identify hardware that will be needed to support the interconnection,
including communications lines, routers, firewalls, hubs, switch, servers,
and computer workstations. Determine whether existing hardware is
sufficient, or whether additional components are required, especially if
future growth is anticipated. If new hardware is required, select products
that ensure interoperability” (Grance et al, 2002)
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“Identify software that will be needed to support the interconnection,
including software for firewalls, servers, and computer workstations.
Determine whether existing software is sufficient, or whether additional
software is required. If new software is required, select products that
ensure interoperability.”
(Grance et al, 2002)

• Identification and
Authentification
• Security Controls

“Identify security controls that will be implemented to protect the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the connected systems and
the data that will pass between them. Controls can be selected from the
examples provided in Section 4 or from other sources. Controls should be
appropriate for the systems that will be connected and the environment in
which the interconnection will operate” (Grance et al, 2002)

• System and Communication
Protection
OPERATIONAL CONTROLS
“Define a security training and awareness program for all authorized
• Awareness, Training, and
personnel who will be involved in managing, using, and/or operating the
Education

interconnection. The program may be incorporated into current security
training and awareness activities. Identify training requirements,
including frequency and scheduling, and assign responsibility for
conducting training and awareness activities. Design training to ensure
that personnel are familiar with IT security policy, procedures, and the
rules of behavior associated with the interconnection. Require users to
sign an acknowledgement form indicating that they understand their
security responsibilities, if appropriate. If shared applications are used,
ensure users know how to use them properly. If the interconnection is
used to exchange or transfer sensitive data, ensure that users understand
special requirements for handling such data, if required. See NIST
Special Publication 800-50, Building an Information Technology Security
Awareness and Training Program, for guidance” (Grance et al, 2002)

• Availability

“Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information…” [44
U.S.C., SEC. 3542]. A loss of availability is the disruption of access to
or use of information or an information system” (Evans et al, 2004).

• Compliance

Identification and compliance with applicable leagal requirements;
intellectual property rights (IPR); safeguarding of organizational records;
data protection and privacy of personal information; prevention of misuse
of information processing facility; regulation of cryptographic controls;
collection of evidence; review of security policies and technical
compliance. (Thiagarajan, 2003)

• Confidentiality

““Preserving authorized restrictions on information access and
disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and
proprietary information…” [44 U.S.C., Sec. 3542]. A loss of
confidentiality is the unauthorized disclosure of information.” (Evans
et al, 2004).
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• Configuration Management
• Contingency Planning

“Each organization should have a contingency plan(s) to respond to and
recover from disasters and other disruptive contingencies that could
affect its IT system, ranging from the failure of system components to the
loss of computing facilities. Determine how to notify each other of such
contingencies, the extent to which the organizations will assist each
other, and the terms under which assistance will be provided. Identify
emergency points of contact (POC). Determine whether to incorporate
redundancy into components supporting the interconnection, including
redundant interconnection points, and how to retrieve data backups.
Coordinate disaster response training, testing, and exercises. See NIST
Special Publication 800-34, Contingency Planning Guide for Information
Technology Systems, for more information” (Grance et al, 2002)

• Data Element Naming and
Ownership

“Determine whether the data element naming schemes used by both
organizations are compatible, or whether new databases must be
normalized so the organizations can use data passed over the
interconnection. In addition, determine whether ownership of data is
transferred from the transmitting party to the receiving party, or whether
the transmitting party retains ownership and the receiver becomes the
custodian. As part of this effort, determine how transferred data will be
stored, whether data may be re-used, and how data will be destroyed. In
addition, determine how to identify and resolve potential data element
naming conflicts” (Grance et al, 2002)

• Integrity / Accuracy
(System and Information
Integrity)

“Guarding against improper information modification or destruction,
and includes ensuring information non-repudiation and
authenticity…” [44 U.S.C., Sec. 3542]. A loss of integrity is the
unauthorized modification or destruction of information” (Evans et
al, 2004)

• Data Sensitivity, Asset
Classification and Control

“Identify the sensitivity level of data or information resources that will be
made available, exchanged, or passed one-way only across the
interconnection. Identifying data sensitivity is critical for determining the
security controls that should be used to protect the connected systems
and data. Examples of sensitive data include financial data, personal
information, and proprietary business data. See NIST Special Publication
800-18, Guide for Developing Security Plans for Information Technology
Systems, for further guidance.”

• Documentation
• Hardware and Systems
Software Maintenance
• Incident Reporting and
Response Capability

“Establish procedures to report and respond to anomalous and suspicious
activity that is detected by either technology or staff. Determine when
and how to notify each other about security incidents that could affect
the interconnection. Identify the types of information that will be
reported, including the cause of the incident, affected data or programs,
and actual or potential impact. In addition, identify types of incidents that
require a coordinated response, and determine how to coordinate
response activities. It might be appropriate to develop a joint incident
response plan for this purpose. For more information, see NIST Special
Publication 800-3, Establishing a Computer Security Incidence Response
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Capability (CSIRC), and Federal Computer Incident Response Center
(FedCIRC) publications” (Grance et al, 2002)

• Level and Method of
Interconnection

• Maintenance
• Media Protection / Data
Backup

“Define the level of interconnectivity that will be established between the
IT systems, ranging from limited connectivity (limited data exchange) to
enterprise-level connectivity (active sharing of data and applications). In
addition, describe the method used to connect the systems (dedicated line
or VPN).”

“Determine whether data or information that is passed across the
interconnection must be backed up and stored. If backups are required,
identify the types of data that will be backed up, how frequently backups
will be conducted (daily, weekly, or monthly), and whether backups will
be performed by one or both parties. Also, determine how to perform
backups, and how to link backups to contingency plan procedures.
Critical data should be backed up regularly, stored in a secure off-site
location to prevent loss or damage, and retained for a period approved by
both parties. Similarly, audit logs should be copied, stored in a secure
location, and retained for a period approved by both parties” (Grance et
al, 2002)

• Personnel Security

Security in job definition, resourcing, and responsibilities; personnel
screening policy; confidentiality agreements; terms and conditions of
employment; user training; reporting, responding and learning of
incidents, weaknesses, and malfunctions; disciplinary process
(Thiagarajan, 2003)

• Physical and Environmental
Security

Physical security, such as the separate network, locks, safes, secure
rooms, etc. that support that system; maintaining a physical security
perimeter, physical entry controls, securing offices, rooms and facilities,
secure working environment, isolated delivery and loading areas.
Equipment Security: equipment siting protection, power supplies, cabling
security, equipment maintenance, securing of equipment off-premises
(TDY, etc), secure disposal or re-use of equipment
General: clearing desk and clear screen polcies, removal of property
(Thiagarajan, 2003)

• Production, Input/Output
Controls
• Rules of Behavior

• Services and Applications

“Develop rules of behavior that clearly delineate the responsibilities and
expected behavior of all personnel who will be authorized to access the
interconnection. The rules should be in writing, and they should state the
consequences of inconsistent behavior or noncompliance. The rules
should be covered in a security training and awareness program” (Grance
et al, 2002)
“Identify the information services that will be provided over the
interconnection by each organization and the applications associated with
those services, if appropriate. Examples of services include e-mail, file
transfer protocol (FTP), RADIUS, Kerberos, database query, file query,
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and general computational services” (Grance et al, 2002)

• Systems Development and
Maintenance
• Impact on Existing
Infrastructure and
Operations

The analysis and specification of security requirements

• User Community

“the community of users who will access, exchange, or receive data
across the interconnection. Determine whether users must possess certain
characteristics corresponding to data sensitivity levels, such as
employment status or nationality requirements, and whether background
checks and security clearances are required.3 Devise an approach for
compiling and managing the profiles of all users who will have access to
the interconnection, including user identification, workstation addresses,
workstation type, operating system, and any other relevant information.
Each organization should use this information to develop and maintain a
comprehensive database of its users” (Grance et al, 2002)

“Determine whether the network or computer infrastructure currently
used by both organizations is sufficient to support the interconnection, or
whether additional components are required (e.g., communication lines,
routers, switches, servers, and software). If additional components are
required, determine the potential impact that installing and using them
might have on the existing infrastructure, if any. In addition, determine
the potential impact the interconnection could have on current operations,
including increases in data traffic; new training requirements; and new
demands on system administration, security, and maintenance” (Grance
et al, 2002)

MANAGEMENT CONTROLS
“Examining the buisiness continuity processes, analyisis of impacts;
• Business Continuity
writing and implementing a continuity plan and framework; testing,
Management
maintaining and re-assessing the plan” (Thiagarajan, 2003)

• Certification, Accrediation,
and Security Assements
• Change Management

• Classification &
Declassification
Management
• Communications and
Operations Management
• Costs and Budgeting

“Determine how to coordinate the planning, design, and implementation
of changes that could affect the connected systems or data, such as
upgrading hardware or software, or adding services. Establish a forum
with appropriate staff from each organization to review proposed changes
to the interconnection, as appropriate. Coordinating change management
activities will reduce the potential for implementing changes that could
disrupt the availability or integrity of data, or introduce vulnerabilities”
(Grance et al, 2002)

“Identify the expected costs required to plan, establish, and maintain the
interconnection. Identify all associated costs, including labor, hardware,
software, communications lines, applications, facilities, physical security,
training, and testing. Also, identify costs for certifying and accrediting
the interconnection after it is established, if appropriate. Develop a

89

comprehensive budget, and determine how costs will be apportioned
between the parties, if required” (Grance et al, 2002)

• Life Cycle
• Planning
• Review of Security Controls
and Policies
• Risk Assessment
• Risk Management
• Roles and Responsibilities

• Scheduling

“Identify personnel who will be responsible for establishing, maintaining,
or managing the interconnection, including managers, system
administrators, application designers, auditors, security staff, and
specialists from such fields as insurance and risk management. Choose
personnel who have appropriate subject matter expertise. If contractors
are involved, one or both organizations may be required to develop a
nondisclosure agreement to safeguard the confidentiality and integrity of
exchanged data” (Grance et al, 2002)
“Develop a preliminary schedule for all activities involved in planning,
establishing, and maintaining the interconnection. Also, determine the
schedule and conditions for terminating or reauthorizing the
interconnection. For example, both parties might agree to review the
interconnection every 12 months to determine whether to reauthorize it
for continued operation” (Grance et al, 2002)

•
•
•
•
•

Organizational Security
Security Policy
Segregation of Duties
System Security Plan
Systems and Services
Acquisition
• Usefulness

“Consider the usefulness of the geospatial information to adversaries to
include assessing the local threat environment, and installation
vulnerability assessments” (Zettler, 2002)

derived from (Evans et al, 2004; Grance et al, 2002; Information Security Oversight Office,
2006; ISO/IEC 17799, 2000; Thiagarajan, 2003; Thiagarajan, 2005)
The case study did show that there was a need to identify security elements for the
GeoBase program to assist with self-assessments and annual program reviews. Perhaps
these constructs will provide additional thoughts on how to assess and develop metrics for
measuring security successes throughout the different commands. Sharing lessons learned
from these types of subject areas can only help to improve confidentiality, integrity, and
availability as a whole.
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PG5 What are the impacts of information security on information sharing within the
GeoBase community?
Research question PG3 addressed the different information security concerns and
how these barriers can get in the way of sharing information. Question PG5 will explore
information sharing within the context of the GeoBase community in order to gain a better
understanding of its impacts on information security. Six questions help to bring
understanding of who uses and shares geospatial information within the Air Force and
provide insight into the security requirements and controls needed for providing security.
The six questions we will explore using interviews, observations, and archived
documents in this section are: 1) Whom are we sharing geospatial information with? 2)
What is the geospatial information used for? 3) How are we sharing geospatial
information? 4) Who are the primary GeoBase customers using and sharing geospatial
information? 5) What are the impacts of sharing geospatial information? moreover 6)
How do security concerns affect information sharing?

Whom are we sharing geospatial information with?
Installations do not operate in a vacuum and therefore cannot be expected to divorce
itself from the local community. Users all over the base and local communities depend on
information from each other for emergency, disaster response, and community planning
efforts, open communication is needed and a trusting collaborative environment is required.
GeoBase has fostered an open culture based on the benefits of information sharing. When
asked about whom information is shared with, the answer comes back just shy of everyone.
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Information is shared widely across different organizations and mission functions at the
installations, up and down the chain of command amongst the different levels of an
individual service, across the services, with other parts of the Department of Defense
(DoD) and other federal agencies, state, local, and tribal governments, typically at a
minimum classification of FOUO. (Headquarters Air Force Geo Integration Office, 2006).
To varying degrees, the Air Force also shares its geospatial data assets with our allied
governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), universities, and commercial
sector contractors (Lachman, 2006).
One command noted that over the Air Force Portal they reach 600,000 to 800,000
users and receive in upwards of 350,000 hits per week to view the 16 common installation
pictures (CIPs) posted. Although they have not been able to separate out the type of users
by Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) or general organization, they are getting back
statistical reports that are becoming more useful, such as determining what areas and
functions of the map and information have been most demand. If something happened
where they needed to identify someone individually, they could. Over the SIPRnet,
MAJCOMs can track unique individual users and know what they are doing on the map,
such as calculating the parking area of an apron at Base X.
What is the geospatial information used for?
Ms. Beth Lachman, and her team at RAND National Defense Research Institute, is
conducting research on “Assessing the Impacts of Sharing Geospatial Data Assets Across
the Department of Defense (DoD)” (Lachman, 2006). In preliminary studies, her team
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has identified 13 mission data uses, in Figure 17, associated with the base (shown in green)
and another four uses associated more closely with warfighting (shown in blue).

Multiple Mission Uses of I&E Geospatial Data Assets
Base Management
and Operations
Public Affairs/
Outreach

Base Planning

Emergency
Planning, Response
and Recovery

Production of
Military
Installation Maps
Command, Control,
Com, & Computer
Systems

Military Health

Supporting Base
Quality of Life

Transportation

Warfighting
Planning

I&E
Geospatial
Data Assets

Warfighting
Operations

Environmental
Management

Logistics
Homeland
Defense
and CIP

Safety and
Security
Strategic
Basing

Draft

LEGEND
Green = Mission usually
associated with the base

Training

Blue = Mission associated
with warfighting
12

Figure 17. Multiple Mission Uses of Installation & Environment (I&E) (Lachman, 2006)
The following list (see Table 12 below) is a brainstorm of ideas and activities that
include both actual and potential uses of what geospatial information is or could provide.
These uses denote just the tip of the iceberg, but give an idea of the depth and breadth of
the power of geographic information systems (GIS).
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Table 12. Potential Uses of Geospatial Information
Aircraft Data
Aircraft Parking
Fuel Pit Status
Mission Schedules
Air Show Planning
Integration with the other systems: GDSS, Global Procedures
System (TERPS), FalconView, Aircrew Portal, CAMPS,
TBMCS-UL, JOPES, SMS

Wing Staff
Facilities Database (XPR)
Facility Treaty Inspection Areas (CCT)
Future Modification Plans (XPR)
Jurisdiction Maps (JAG)
Radio Frequency Footprint (XPR)
Range Site Codes (Range Ops)
Real Property Database (START Insp Bldgs) (CCT)
START Reports (CCT)
Courtroom litigation (gather, analyze, present
geographically-referenced evidence) (JAG)
Congregation Demographic, Outreach (HC)
Historic District Mapping (HO)
Historic Event Locations (HO)
Tying Key Event Details to Map Locations (HO)
Relating Date-Stamped Photos to Map Locations (HO)
Inspection Preparation Activities (IG)
Public Announcements, Newspaper Mapping Requirements
(PA)
FOL Deployment Intel Briefings (A2)
Daily Intel Briefs (A2)
3-D modeling for flood management and tidal wave planning
Analysis for emergency operation and evacuation plans
Emergency planning for special events
Training exercises, e.g. earthquake simulation and chemical
response

Logistics Group
Real-Time Location of People and Cargo on the Installation,
Location of Aircraft on Ramp and Readiness/Maintenance
Status, ESSP/BSP
Aircraft Parking and Status (integrated with Geo81 and
CAMS)
GFE Equipment (LSS)
HAZMAT Pharmacy (LSS)
Hypergolic Fuels Database (LSS)
Hypergolic Process Safety Inspections (LSS)
Standard Base Supply System (LSS)
Integration with other systems: G081/CAMS, LOGCAT
(EKB/STEP), LOGMOD?, PAX Systems (Passenger
Manifest), ITV, RFID, GTN, GATES
Medical Group
Flight Health
Injuries/Illness Report
Monitoring Data (DW)
Occupational Risk Assessments
Drinking Well Locations
Air Models
Mold Surveys
Disease Mapping (Public Health)
Water Sampling and BioHazard Points/Results
Ambulatory Service Reqmts and Response Locations Log
Pharmacy Locations

Safety
Explosive Storage Locations (SE / LG)
Explosive Haul Routes Routes (SE)
Bird Air Strike Hazards (BASH) Management (SE)
Confined Space Locations (SE)
Explosive Safety Quantitative Distance (ESQD Arcs) Zone
Maps/Explosive Permits (SE)
TERPS (on base and off base airfield obstructions)
Toxic Hazard Corridors (SE)
Base Evacuation Plan (SE)
Destruct Zones (SE)
Impact Limit Lines (SE)
Real Property Database (Penetrability) (SE)
Railroad Traffic (SE)
Off-Shore Oil Area Parcel Grids (SE)

Support Group
Security Forces
Restricted Areas (SF)
Building Security Features (SF)
Access Control Points
Observation Points
Emergency Routes

Operations Group
Visualize Airfield Features, Obstructions, etc. to Aircrew
NOTAM Maps
Imaginary Surfaces/Aerodrome
Flight Corridors (DOJ)
Flight Path Maps (DOJ)
ILS Area Definition (DOJ)
Meteorology Tower Locations (DOW)
Meteorology Data (DOW)
Real Property Database (Range Bldgs) (Range)
RF Frequencies (Range)
Risk Assessment Codes (SE)
Safety Equipment Inventory (SE)
Safety Inspection/Audit File (SE)
Seismic Data (DOW)
Special Use Airspace (DOJ)
Terminal Instrument Approach Procedures (DOJ)
Toxic Hazard Corridors (DOW)
Airspace Boundaries (Range)
Antenna/Radar Tower Database (Range)
Critical Launch Facilities List (Range)
Elevations (LOS) (Range)

Communications (A6)
Comm Infrastructure Locations
Mass Notification Systems Coverage Areas
Office Location Linked to GAL
Cable TV (SC)
Communication Lines (SC)
Communication Equipment (SC)
Personnel/Address (SC)
Services
Recreational Facilities List (SVS)
AAFES Locations (AAFES)
Golf Course Management (SVS)
Golf Course Irrigation (SVS)
Fitness Center, jogging routes (SVS)
Management of Self Storage Lot / Lemon Lot (SVS)
Outdoor Recreational opportunities, locations, times, events
(SVS)
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Earthquake Fault Maps (CEC)
Fire Evacuation Plan (CEF)
Fire History (CEF)
Digital Pre-Fire Plans (CEF)
Fire Hydrant Test Data File (CEF)
Monoco Fire Alarm System integration (CEF / CEO)
Floor Plans (Alarms, Hydrants) (CEF / CEC)
HAZMAT Routes (CEF)
Future Real-Time Location Tracking (GPS Transponders)
(CEF)

SVS-Produced Lodging Guest Maps (SVS)
Engineering & Base Development
Base Layout Map (CEC)
Building Centroids (CEC)
Building Location and Height (CEC)
Building Maintenance (CEC)
Jurisdiction Maps (CEC)
Land Use/Zones (CEC)
Landscaping Plan (CEC)
Crash Grids (CEC)
Demographic Data(Occupancy) (CEC)
5-Yr Future Construction Map (CEC)
Topography (CEC)
Traffic Logs (CEC)
Transportation Routes (CEC)
Aerial Photography (CEC)
ACES-PM Data (CEC)
Historical Aerial Photography (CEC)
AICUZ (Noise Contours) (CEC)
Work Order Request (AF Form 332) (CEO)
AF Form 1391 (CEC)
Dig Permits (AF Form 103) (CEO)
Landfill Records (CEO)
Lightning Protections (CEO)
Monitoring Data (Landfills) (CEO)
Pavement Management (CEO)
Pesticide Management Plan (CEO)
1-2 Yr Planned Construction/Renovation (CEO)
Refrigerants (ODCs) Database (CEO)
Service Contracts (CEO)
Utilities (CEO)
Linked System Map to Media Files (.mpg) Showing Videos
From Inside Sewer System
Feature Location (Valves, Manholes, Transformers, etc)
Water Distribution (CEO)
Sanitary System (CEO)
Wastewater / Storm System (CEO)
High Temperature Hot Water System (CEO)
Liquid Fuels System (CEO)
Electrical System (CEO)
Natural Gas System (CEO)
Snow Removal (CEO)
WIMS HW Management Module (CEO)
Facility Manager Information (CEO)
Lead and Asbestos Surveys (CEO / CEV)
Roof Inspections (CEO)
Track Installation Damage Assessment (Airfield & Facilities)
(CEO)
UXO Cordon Areas (CED)
NBC Detector Locations and Status (CEX)
Plot Chemical Release plumes (CEX)

Environmental
Ground Cover Maps (CEV)
Hazardous Waste Sampling Data (CEV)
Hazardous Waste Tracking System (CEV)
HAZMAT Plan (CEV)
Hazardous Materials Management (Pesticides, ODS, PCB
mapping)
Historical Water Table Data (CEV)
Hunting/Fishing Maps (CEV)
Industrial Waste Loadings (CEV)
IRP Site Maps/Reports (CEV)
Landfill Loading Records (CEV)
Artifact Photos (CEV)
Asbestos Survey Database (CEV)
Background Concentrations (CEV)
Monitoring Data (Air) (CEV)
Contaminated Soil Locations (CEV)
Monitoring Data (Soil) (CEV)
Monitoring Well Locations (CEV)
Natural Resources Study Areas/Data (CEV)
NPDES Permits (CEV)
Opportunity Assessments for PP (CEV)
Chem Hazard Emerg Response Plans (CEV)
Coastal Zone Management Plans (CEV)
Depth to Groundwater (CEV)
Endangered and sensitive Species (CEV)
Invasive species monitoring (CEV)
Environmental Project List (CEV)
Prime and Unique Farm Lands (CEV)
Process Waste Quantities (CEV)
PSD Station (Air Monitor) Locations (CEV)
Resources (Natural, Cultural, Historical) (CEV)
SPCC- UST (CEV)
Species Maps/Lists (CEV)
Tank Database (CEV)
TIP Tape - ‘76 Vegetation Study (CEV)
TSDF Permits (CEV)
Vegetation Fuel Age Class (CEV)
Vegetation Maps (CEV)
Vent Stacks on Pads (CEV)
Waste Maintenance Tracking System (CEV)
Waste Profiles (SB14)
Waste Stream Analysis (CEV)
Waste Stream Data
Water Quality Reports (IWTP)
Wetlands (CEV)
Ambient Air Quality Data (CEV)
Ambient Water Quality Locations (CEV)
Water management (3-D modeling of runoff)
Flood management
Watershed modeling of burn area from accidental fire
Incinerator analysis
Natural resource management
Cultural resources, archeological mapping
Encroachment analysis with aerial imaging overlays
GIS-based Environmental Management System

Resources
Floor Plans (CEC / CER)
Mineral Resource Management Plan (CER)
Economic Data (CER)
Demolition Plan (CER)
Real Property Database (CER)
Real Property Database (% Utilization) (CER)
Real Property Database (Building Use) (CER)
Real Property Database (useable life of buildings) (CER)
Facility Category Codes (CER)
Space Utilization Management (CER)
Fire Department
Emergency Dispatch (Visual Control) (CEF)
Combined Dispatch Use (CEF / SFS / MDG ER)
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How are we sharing geospatial information?
With as many different uses and sharing relationships exist, there are equally as
many ways in which to physically use and share information. The internet and intranet
are the primary means to share data. A6 (Communications) has established network
protocols that allow network controls. The network essentially controls the gateway
through which information is shared. Web viewers such as ArcIMS, a popular Internet
Mapping Service with the GeoBase community, and ESRI’s solution for delivering
dynamic maps and GIS data and services via the Web. It provides a highly scalable
framework for GIS Web publishing that meets the needs of corporate Intranets and
demands of worldwide Internet access” (ESRI, 2006). These web services provide the
GIS viewing capabilities for the average non-GIS familiar users without the use of
expensive standalone GIS software. For the majority of the GeoBase users across the
installation, web viewers provide both accessibility and functionality. For those users
who require a more sophisticated analysis and editing tool, they turn towards GIS desktop
applications, such as ArcView, ArcInfo, ArcAnalyst, ArcGIS or ArcMap (ESRI’s
desktop GIS software used by the Air Force). Other methods in which information is
shared is over the non-web based network systems, such as shared drives and folders; the
“sneaker net” method, using mobile storage media (CDs, DVDs, floppy disks, thumb
drives, etc.) to move and share information from one user or location to another. Table
13 highlights the primary methods of sharing information in the GeoBase community.
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Table 13. Information Sharing Methods and Concerns
Sharing Method
(Lachman, 2006:10)
Web Viewer
Desktop Application
Non-web based network systems
Sneaker-net (Mobile Media)

Map and Document Products

Video and Simulators
Field technology applications
Specialized mission studies

GeoBase Example

Security Concern

- ArcIMS Web sever (via
the Air Force Portal)
- ArcGIS
- Base network shared
drives (X://Drive)
- Email
- Floppy disks
- CD / DVDs
- Thumb drives
- Mobile hard drives
- MP3 players
- Printed Maps
- PowerPoint
- PDF
- Screen-shots
- Image files (.jpgs, tiffs)
- Email attachments
- Video files (.mpgs)
- Mission reports
- Conferences
- Briefings

Who are the primary GeoBase customers using and sharing geospatial information?
It is interesting to map the spread of geospatial information as users GeoBase
program reaches out to new users or vice versa. As discussed in chapter two, the
GeoBase program grew out of the Civil Engineering community as a Wing mission
support program. In the early stages, geospatial information centered on civil
engineering type information such as the common installation picture (CIP) type of
information. Since the Air Force environmental flight had a history and experience using
GIS information, environmental was one of the first to align themselves with GeoBase.
Because of this early adoption and continued organizational support, the now robust
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environmental mission data sets receive much attention. Several commands now employ
dedicated staff to manage the demand for environmental information. Other early
adopters were the emergency responders, particularly the fire, security forces, and
readiness communities. The graphic below (Figure 18) illustrates the geospatial
information centers of gravity within the Air Force. This graphic shows the relationships
and magnitude of key information users.
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Figure 18. Air Force Geospatial Centers of Gravity

Notice how the nucleus of the information centered close to the operations of the mission
and focused around the primary users of the installation warfighting platform. On the
periphery, are the secondary users, the operations support centers, other services and
organizations who have vested interests, information providers such as National
Geointelligence Agency (NGA) and the Intelligence communities, as well as the
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expertise and skills of contractors and non-governmental agencies which the installations
rely. This later center of gravity notes an area of concern and will be discussed in more
detail in another section.
The following graph (see Figure 19 below), from the RAND study, shows the
distribution of users on one installation’s ArcIMS web server and supports the above
observations of defining the primary users.
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Figure 19. Case Study of Ramstein AB ArcIMS (Lachman, 2006)
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If we can accept this installation as stereotypical of users across the command at
other installations, then the conclusions on the primary GeoBase customers and users can
be validated. Civil Engineering, Communications, Security Forces are shown as the top
base-level users, while MAJCOM and higher-headquarters (consisting of fewer users)
also remain as primary users. Arguably, as users become more familiar with the tools
and information available, user’s dependence on this type of information will continue to
grow, as will threats and vulnerabilities. See the relationship between user familiarity
and amount of information shared and risks to security in Figure 20 below.
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Familiarity with Geospatial Assets
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Figure 20. Impact of Familiarity with Geospatial Assets on Amount of Information
Shared and Risk to Security

How does sharing information impact risk?
Vulnerabilities wait at each interchange and as demand for the interconnectedness
spread, communications squadrons became more heavily involved, both as network
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infrastructure providers and as customers who found their own benefit to managing
information geospatially. As these networks become wider spread, the security controls
become more complex, see Figure 21.
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Figure 21. Information Sharing and Security Risk Relationship

What are the impacts of sharing geospatial information?
Now that we have seen how raising the amount of information shared also raises
the risk potential. We know that completely cutting off the flow of information is
unrealistic, but the tendency to start shutting down and limit the flow often happens
without consideration of the other affects and benefits of sharing information. Table 14
begins to explore the additional benefits and impacts achieved through the sharing of
information.
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Table 14. Impacts of Sharing Information
Impacts
(Lachman, 2006:10)
Efficiencies

Effectiveness

Benefits
(Lachman, 2006:10)
-

Process Improvements

Affects to the Mission

-

Cost savings
Time savings
Manpower impacts
Improving contractor oversight
Improving operations, decision-making, and
planning
Performing new task that would/could not be
done before
Improving working relationships
Improving communications processes
Mostly automating a formerly manual process
Changing an analysis process
Policy impacts
Educational and training impacts
Public relations impact
Legal impact
Employee morale and productivity affects

Particularly in emergency situations, a high demand for information is required early in
the response so that the right decisions and plans can be put into place. (MacFarlane,
2005:19). Figure 22 shows the typical information demand gap in the demand and
availability of information.
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Figure 22. Information Demand-Provision Gap following an emergency event (based on
work by Peter Power, Visor Consultants, 2004) (MacFarlane, 2005:8)
Whereas, Figure 23 depicts how an increase in the availability of information can narrow
the gap between the need for information and what is available.

Figure 23. Accelerating information availability to keep closer pace with demand (based
on work by Peter Power, Visor Consultants, 2004) (MacFarlane, 2005:26)

103

The shared geospatial information GeoBase provides help narrow this gap in the
Air Force. Survival Recovery Centers (SRCs), Damage Control Groups (DCGs), Unit
Control Centers (UCC), on-scene commanders through GIS and shared information
networks, such as the Theater Battle Management Control System (TBMCS), a clearer
situational picture is presented to a variety of decision makers. Now, instead of waiting
hours for enough information for command and control to make a decision that it is safe
to carry on the mission, is now completed with more precision, in much less time, and
with a higher degree confidence.

PG6 What are the costs and benefits of either limiting or providing access to the
data? Do they outweigh the risks?
As the concern over information security grows, the tendency seems to be that the
sharing of information becomes limited, thus reducing the opportunities to synthesize
information a helpful or a malicious way. There are costs involved to limit or manage the
flow of information, both financial and non-monetary (mission) costs.
Financial Investments
Some experts have tried to calculate the financial costs of putting a classification
on information. A 2005 cost report on government security classification done by the
Information Security Oversight Office (ISSO) reported, “the total security classification
cost estimates within Government for FY 2005 is $7.7 billion. This figure represents
estimates provided by 41 executive branch agencies, including the Department of
Defense. It does not include, however, the cost estimates of the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), which that agency has classified” (Information Security Oversight Office,
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2006). Costs were divided into the following security constructs: physical security, such
as the separate network, locks, safes, secure rooms, etc. that support that system;
information security, which includes classification management, declassification, and
information systems security for classified information; professional education, training
and awareness; security management and planning; and unique miscellaneous items.
(Information Security Oversight Office, 2006). Figure 24 breaks out the costs for each
category, whereas Figure 25 compares the total government costs to that of industry for a
ten-year period to provide further perspective.

Figure 24. Government Security Classification Costs Estimate Fiscal Year 2005
(Information Security Oversight Office, 2006)
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Figure 25. Graph Comparing Total Costs for Government and
Industry for FY 1995-2005 (Information Security Oversight Office, 2006)
“In the past, the costs for the implementation of the programs to classify, safeguard and
declassify national security information were deemed non-quantifiable, intertwined with
other overhead expenses. While portions of the program’s costs remain ambiguous, ISOO
continues to collect cost estimate data and to monitor the methodology used for its
collection. Requiring agencies to provide exact responses to the cost collection efforts
would be cost prohibitive. Consequently, ISOO relies on the agencies to estimate the
costs of the security classification system. The collection methodology has remained
stable over the past 11 years, providing a good indication of the trends in total cost.
Nonetheless, it is important to note that absent any security classification activity, many
of the expenditures reported herein would continue to be made in order to address other,
overlapping security requirements” (Information Security Oversight Office, 2006).
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Agencies, such as the Air Force, who invest in the GIS hardware, software, data
and training understand the potential gains on their return on investment. Sure, there are
high upfront costs, but “the level of benefit will be maintained over time as effectiveness
and efficiency gains are realized” (see Figure 26) (MacFarlane, 2005:82).

Figure 26. Timescale of Costs and Benefits of GIS Investments (MacFarlane, 2005:82)
In this section, we have explored a few aspects of different assumed financial
costs. The next section will delve into the difficultly of putting a price on the demand for
answers from information, particularly when the stakes of the questions are high.
Non-Monetary and Mission Benefits
Although it is unknown just how much it takes to secure the geospatial
information of the GeoBase program, one can see that there are plenty of fiscal costs
associated with the elements of security. Nonetheless, of greater value to the program is
the understanding of the non-monetary costs of restricting access to customers that cost in
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incalculable. The potential of restricted information having far bigger costs than just
dollar costs are great. Not only are financial costs involved of things that we can see and
count, but also there are the “would have” or “could have” costs of what would or could
have happened if the information were not available when a particular decision was to be
made. By keeping information out of the hands that need it could cost millions of dollars
for an improperly sited building, millions in legal fees for an environmental disaster
litigation process, or worse the potential of loss of aircraft and human life. For example,
if explosive safety Q-D arcs are not shared and a contract is let to construct a building
inside a Q-D arc, a lot of money is spent in change orders and redesign fees or the base
inherits a risk to the facilities being inside a safety zone. On the other hand, knowing
where the Q-D arcs are and their size, one could figure out what may be stored in that
area that we do not necessarily want them to know. It becomes a fine balancing act.
Another example of restricting information is confining it to the SIPRnet. SIPRnet is
much more difficult to use that the NIPRnet and very difficult to deploy with. The Air
Force Contingency Response Groups (CRGs) are an example of users of geospatial
information who face the challenges of how to deal with sensitive information they
collect for GeoReach. The GeoReach package relies on deploying forward, collecting
data, and sending it back to the rear using NMARAT, a satellite communications system
that can provide secure communications up to SECRET level. There are many reasons to
keep things unclassified. Keeping information at a level so that it is readily available for
use is important to maintain.
In the end, the cost is to the mission degradation and or mission effectiveness. If
people cannot get quick access to the information they need, then they are bound to go
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out and spend money or time to recollect. This can severely delay mission
accomplishment (see Figure 27).
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Figure 27. Information Restriction and Mission Accomplishment Relationship

Conversely, if people can be exposed to the information and know where to go to find it,
time, money, and manpower can be decreased while increasing mission accomplishment.
Another example, at one base, someone dealing with the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) maintained the understanding that the identity of base wells were not to be
released or represented on the map and became concerned when a GeoBase map showed
a building that housed a water well, a discussion ensued o have it removed. The historic
document that was the basis of their understanding did not specify oil wells, water wells,
drinking wells, etc. The GeoBase map had not annotated the facility identifying the
facility as a well site. The problem comes in that if there was ever an emergency (fire,
etc) and the fire department had to respond to that building, how are they going to
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respond to it, if it is not on the map? Eventually, senior leadership took responsibility for
it and allowed the information to be published. In this case, they were able to come to an
understanding, but this example brings up two good points. One we have people out
there that are appropriately concerned for the welfare of the base and have different
perspectives of how information should be classified. The second is that it is important
for communities with different perspectives to come together, while understanding that
locking down information and not making it available to people is not the best answer,
but look holistically at physical, logical, and administrative controls that can be enacted
to overcome a complex and common goal..
A key finding in this research is that knowledge management is an important
element in information security and information sharing. It is not always about giving
and sharing the data, it is about sharing the awareness that the data exists. It is all about
DATA DISCOVERABILITY. It is about information awareness and knowing where to
get it. It may be available through a website, or speaking to a subject matter expert
(SME), or the library. You can certainly restrict data to control better help alleviate
some of these security concerns, but the problem is that you limit the intent of what the
whole program is for of disseminate the information take advantage of the data being
created. From the ESRI perspective, they want to be able to map the world and provide
the data to everybody. That is good, but we must be careful where it may begin to
interfere with our national security. There are many places to find information, it may be
good to restrict access, but the key is not to restrict data discoverability.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
In this chapter, we discuss the conclusions, recommendations, and suggestions for
future research. This exploratory case study only begins to scratch the surface of GIS
operational security issues. By no means is this study able to include the magic answer
on securing geospatial information or the key to opening the door to the challenges of
information sharing. It can however, continue, and in some cases begin, the needed
discussion on these important issues challenging the Air Force community. Without
purposeful discussion and awareness of the challenges, we cannot expect to adapt our
business processes and policies to address to keep up with the constant changes in
vulnerabilities and threats brought about by time and technology.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Increased use of electronic data sharing denotes a greater chance of information
misuse, both inside and outside the Air Force. As the repository of critical information
builds, GeoBase information will face a heightened risk of being targeted through cyber
terror attacks. The security implications of the USAF GeoBase program are but a subset
of a growing national dilemma that plagues academics and practitioners.
We have seen the inevitable swinging of the pendulum from all access and no
control to the desire for tightly regulated and restricted information security laws,
policies, and procedures. It is imperative that common and explicit guidelines are
developed and implemented throughout the USAF and the DoD. There is a need in the
Air Force to establish a tacit understanding that security of information is important and
that the costs involved with not maintaining security standards are intolerable based on
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the understanding of the risk. If this type of mindset does not exist, then the entire
organization will continue to remain at risk and experience mission degradation, reduced
productivity, lost data, revealed military secrets or compromised integrity. Motivating
airmen and civilian partners to realize these risks and prepare them to treat geospatial
data they handle as if it is their own banking information will go a long way in protecting
the missions they serve. Without common standards to dictate minimum-security
requirements and practices, bases will be left to develop and implement their own
security standards. As a whole, the organization is only as strong as the weakest link.
Not only is it imperative to develop policies and procedures for sharing data, but
it is incumbent upon this community to educate itself on the information that exists today.
Information security cannot limit data discovery; rather, it should encourage one's self to
illuminate new data/information while providing the necessary security blanket that the
discoveries will remain in the hands of a safe user community.
There are significant costs; not only financial, but serious mission degradation and
effectiveness are at stake. The first step to moving beyond the problem is establishing
and investing in the appropriate business processes to identify the sensitivity of
information both on its own and combined with other information. Today’s solution of
referring to historical documents, policies, and processes and specific requests by the data
steward or data layer owner has been a good start, but as the information grows in value
and becomes more easily accessible through new technologies, these old decisions must
be rethought as they do not completely address the issues of today’s information
situation. Just as the GeoBase service has helped to overcome the stove-piped mentality
on the map between functional areas through the common vision of “One Base, One
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Map”, similar hurdles must still be over come in other areas of the organization. No one
particular knowledge set will be able to solve this interwoven problem on its own. We
need the expertise of many essential communities such as Information security (Infosec),
Operational security (Opsec), Communications security (Commsec), the GeoBase
Integration Office (GIO), and the data owners to come together to weave a balanced
approach. There is a lot of work ahead, as the environment continuously changes, we
must be willing to adapt. People will continue to find the information they need. If they
do not have quick access to the information, then they are bound to either make a
uniformed decision or spend money or time to recollect. We must keep in mind is that
these efforts are not just about sharing the data itself, but building the awareness that the
information exists. The quest for information security must not limit data discoverability
and the ability to if not share the information, share that it exists and where it may be
found. By actively managing geospatial information and the knowledge it brings we can
more effectively identify and build the processes and have the best of all three worlds:
accuracy, accountability, and access.
Much research is still needed to understand how to find balance between
information security and the need to share data. A greater understanding of the technical
side of computer security and the growing threats in cyberspace combined with the
knowledge of what data providers know about what they provide in their functional area
will help more efficiently and securely align the GeoBase workflows with Air Force
Business processes needed for progress. As we become more connected across functional
areas and between services the more important it become to coordinate our actions and
collectively fight to protect the valuable information that protects us.
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Table 15. Suggestions for Further Study
Proposition
Key Implications for Practice
1
Geospatial Information Sharing

Avenues for Future Research
Pinpointing barriers to information
sharing within the culture of the Air
Force and how they might be
overcome.

2

GeoBase Metrics

A look at how well we have/are
operationalizing GeoBase. HAF
has been collecting an Air Force
wide inventory from the different
units at different levels. What we
do not have is any type of
inspection criteria or analysis of
“best practices”. Identification of
common themes which units and
subsequently major commands and
IG teams to look for that continue
to enable the advancement of the
technology that we’ve invested so
heavily.

3

GeoBase Returns on Investment: Is
GeoBase Paying Off?

Examine the investments made for
GeoBase and determine a way to
identify and quantify the returns on
investment. Are our up-front costs
paying off the way we anticipated
them doing?

4

GeoBase Central Management and
Funding

A look at the implementation and
management of the GeoBase
program's funding chain. As
standards differ from one
MAJCOM to another, some
standards may not be on another's
scope. Managing an Air Force
Program without standards and
sideboards? How do you transition
from "as is" to "to-be" without a
requirement? It is easier from a
MAJCOM perspective, if the units
are funded from that entity. What
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is the best way to fund units from
one source entity or leaving it up to
the units to fund their own
programs; regardless, how do you
set standards and evaluate the
different set requirements?
5

Expanding GeoBase Centers of
Gravity

An examination of the expansion of
GeoBase beyond the parent
organization (CE and other
established centers of gravity).
Bred within the Civil Engineering
organization, GeoBase spreads
beyond the scope of just CE. Are
we organizationally postured to
take advantage of all the
possibilities that GIS (Information
Technology) has to offer?
Organizationally, how do we begin
to expand that beyond CE into other
career fields...much like our Field
Operating Agencies (FOAs), such
as Comm, Security Forces, AFCEE,
AFCESA, etc

6

Information Security of Information
Released to Contractors

How does giving geodatabase
information to a contractor compare
with previously releasing AutoCAD
files?
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116

TBD
TBD

Recommendations
Recommendations for
for
Future
Future Research
Research

3.
3. To
To strengthen
strengthen future
future policies
policies and
and
guidance
guidance to
to better
better safeguard
safeguardinformation
information
while
providing
wider
benefits
while providing wider benefitsto
to the
the
customer
and
the
mission.
customer and the mission.

2.
2. Provide
Provide better
better understanding
understanding of
of what
whatis
is
“appropriate
“appropriate access”
access” to
togeospatial
geospatial
information
information

1.
1. Improve
Improve systemic
systemic security
security design
design and
and
confidence
confidence in
in sharing
sharing information
information across
across
geospatial
geospatialinformation
information systems
systems (GIS).
(GIS).

Motivations
Motivations for
for Research
Research

5.
5. What
Whatare
are the
the costs
costs and
andbenefits
benefits of
of either
either
limiting
limiting or
or providing
providingaccess
accessto
to the
the data?
data?
Do
Do they
they outweigh
outweigh the
the risks?
risks?

4.
4. What
Whatare
are the
the key
key information
information system
system
security
security constructs
constructsand
and their
their
interrelationships?
interrelationships?

2.
2. To
To determine
determine the
the general
general themes
themes and
and characterizations
characterizationsof
of information
information sharing
sharing
on
on geospatial
geospatialinformation,
information, specifically
specifically GeoBase.
GeoBase.

2.
2. What
Whatinformation
information is
is sensitive
sensitive that
thatposes
poses aa
risk
risk to
to security?
security?

Limitations
Limitations

Case
Case
Analysis
Analysis

Applications
Applications

(Potential
(Potential Benefits)
Benefits)

Case
Case
Database
Database

Data
Data
Collection
Collection

Field
Field Work
Work

Case
CaseSelection
Selection

Case
Case Data
Data
Collection
Collection Protocol
Protocol

Research
Research
Design
Design

FRAMEWORK
FRAMEWORK DEVELOPMENT
DEVELOPMENT

(Synthesize
(Synthesize Information
Information in
inLiterature
Literature Review)
Review)

7.
7. Develop
Develop // advocate
advocate aa measurement
measurementtool
toolto
to evaluate
evaluate the
the maturity
maturity of
of an
an
organization’s
organization’s GeoBase
GeoBase program
programand
and policies/practices
policies/practices to
to ensure
ensure maximum
maximum
security
security and
and user
user potential.
potential.

6.
6. Determine
Determine organizational
organizationalabilities
abilities to
to implement
implement the
the current
currentguidelines
guidelines or
or
recommended
recommended actions
actions to
to coordinate
coordinate data
data restrictions
restrictions and
and data
data requests.
requests.

5.
5. To
To use
use an
an exploratory
exploratory case
case study
study methodology
methodology to
to determine
determine understanding
understanding of
of
current
currentorganizational
organizationalprocedures
proceduresand
and identify
identify potential
potentialareas
areas for
for
improvement.
improvement.

4.
4. To
To develop
develop aa conceptual
conceptualframework
framework capturing
capturing the
the impact
impactof
of information
information
sharing
sharingand
andsecurity
security concerns
concerns on
on geospatial
geospatialdatasets
datasets within
within military
military
installations
(USAF
GeoBase).
installations (USAF GeoBase).

1.
1. To
To develop
develop aa set
setof
of general
generalthemes
themes and
and characterizations
characterizations relating
relating to
to the
the
security
securityof
of information
information into
into integrated
integrated geospatial
geospatialinformation
information systems
systems (GIS)
(GIS)

Focused
Focused Objectives
Objectives

Exploration
Explorationbegins
begins with
with some
somesort
sortof
of
rationale
rationaleand
anddirection,
direction, even
evenififlater
later
proven
wrong
(Yin,
2003,
pg
23).
proven wrong (Yin, 2003, pg 23).

Its
Its function
functionisis to
todevelop
developthe
the
evaluation
evaluationquestions,
questions,measures,
measures,
designs,
and
analytic
strategy
designs, and analytic strategyfor
forthe
the
bigger
biggerstudy.
study.(GAO,
(GAO,1990,
1990,pg
pg40)
40)

This
This isis also
alsoaadescriptive
descriptivecase
casestudy
study
but
butisis aimed
aimedat
atgenerating
generating
hypotheses
for
later
investigation
hypotheses for later investigation
rather
ratherthan
thanillustrating.
illustrating.(GAO,
(GAO,1990)
1990)

1.
1. Exploratory
Exploratory Case
CaseStudy
Study

Methodology
Methodology
Literature
Literature Review
Review

Geospatial Information Systems (GIS)
Information Security
Information Assurance
Critical Information
Risk Management
GeoBase
Security Measures
Sensitive / Critical data access controls
Data protection
Digital terrorism
Digital Rights Management
Information Life Cycle
Vulnerability Studies
Terrorism, Information Technology, and
Vulnerability
• Data Integration

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

3.
3. Explore
Explore definitions,
definitions, constructs,
constructs, concepts,
concepts,
frameworks,
frameworks, and
andmodels
modelsin
inrelated
related fields
fieldsof
of
interest,
such
as:
interest, such as:

2.
2. With
With whom
whomis
is information
information shared
shared and
and who
who are
are
the
the GeoBase
GeoBase information
information customers?
customers?

for
forreleasing
releasing//publishing
publishingdata
data our
ourAirmen
Airmenshould
shouldbe
be
following?)
following?)

1.
1. What
Whatis
isthe
thecurrent
currentGeoBase
GeoBase policy
policy and
and
guidance
guidanceon
on securing
securing and
and sharing
sharing
information?
information? (What
(Whatare
arethe
thestandard
standardguidelines
guidelines

Literature
Literature Review
Review

Approach to Research Overview

1.
1. What
Whatis
isthe
the nature
nature of
of the
the security
security risk
risk
posed
posed by
by GeoBase?
GeoBase?

Primary
Primary Research
Research Questions
Questions

Overall Improve the general understanding of importance of
Research Goal: balance between securing and sharing information.

Appendix A: Approach to Research Overview
“Research Road Map” derived from (West, 2006)

Appendix B: Investigation Protocol

Exploratory Case Study
Geospatial Informational Security risks and concerns of
the U.S. Air Force GeoBase Program
Scott A. Bryant
Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, USA
scott.bryant@afit.edu

Abstract .............................................................................................................................. iv
Acknowledgements............................................................................................................ vi
List of Figures ................................................................................................................... vii
List of Tables ..................................................................................................................... ix
I. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1
Overview ........................................................................................................................ 1
Motivations for Research ............................................................................................... 2
Targeted Research Area ................................................................................................. 3
Research Goals............................................................................................................... 4
Overall Approach to Research ....................................................................................... 4
Benefits / Implications of Research ............................................................................... 4
Thesis Overview ............................................................................................................ 5
II. Background .................................................................................................................... 7
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 7
What is Information Security? ....................................................................................... 7
What is Geospatial Information? ................................................................................... 8
GeoBase History ............................................................................................................ 8
Emerging Geospatial Technologies ............................................................................. 11
A New Paradigm .......................................................................................................... 11
New Paradigms, New Problems................................................................................... 12
New Problems, New Policies....................................................................................... 17
Identifying Security Risks............................................................................................ 24
Top Challenges ............................................................................................................ 27

117

III. Methodology ............................................................................................................... 36
Purpose and Organization ............................................................................................ 36
Developing the Research Strategy ............................................................................... 36
Case Study Research .................................................................................................... 38
Why an Exploratory Case Study? ................................................................................ 39
Case Study Design ....................................................................................................... 39
Step 1: Define and Design............................................................................................ 40
Step 2: Prepare, Collect, and Analyze.......................................................................... 50
Step 3: Analyze and Conclude ..................................................................................... 53
Potential Pitfalls ........................................................................................................... 55
Summary of Methodology ........................................................................................... 57
IV. Analysis ...................................................................................................................... 58
PG1 What is the nature of the security risk posed by GeoBase? ................................ 58
PG2 What information is sensitive that poses a risk to security? ............................... 67
PG3 What impacts might information security concerns affect information sharing. 76
PG4 What are the key information system security constructs and their
interrelationships? ........................................................................................................ 82
PG5 What are the impacts of information security on information sharing within the
GeoBase community? .................................................................................................. 91
PG6 What are the costs and benefits of either limiting or providing access to the data?
Do they outweigh the risks?....................................................................................... 104
V. Conclusions and Recommendations ......................................................................... 111
Conclusions and Recommendations .......................................................................... 111
Appendix A: Approach to Research Overview .............................................................. 116
Appendix B: Investigation Protocol................................................................................ 117
Background ................................................................................................................ 119
Key Documents.......................................................................................................... 119
Research Enablers ...................................................................................................... 120
Field Procedures......................................................................................................... 120
A Guide for the Study Report .................................................................................... 123

118

Appendix C: Thesis Research Overview (Sent to Interviewees).................................... 124
Appendix D: Interview Outline ...................................................................................... 130
Appendix E: Relative Laws & Executive Orders (1950 to Present)............................... 133
Appendix F: Relative Policies and Guidance ................................................................. 141
Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 142
Background
Technological advancements such as Geospatial Information Systems (GIS) and
the Internet have made it easier and affordable to share information, thus making
complex and time sensitive decisions with higher levels of confidence. However, the
sharing of information also increases the likelihood that an adversary can gain illicit
access to the information. Today's military leaders face challenging decisions on how to
make geospatial information collected on military installations and organizations
available to authorized communities of interest while simultaneously restricting access to
protect operational security. Often, these decisions are made without understanding how
the sharing of certain combinations of data may pose a significant risk to protecting
critical information, infrastructure or resources. Information security has been an area of
growing concern in the GeoBase community since, by definition, it is required to strike a
balance between competing interests, each supported by federal policy: (1) the
availability of data paid for by tax dollars and (2) the protection of data as required to
mitigate risks. This research sets out to explore the security implications of the US Air
Force GeoBase (the US Air Force's applied Geospatial Information System) program. We
examine the rapid expansion of the use of geospatial information in the military; examine
the intrinsic and extrinsic security risks of the unconstrained sharing of geospatial
information; and explore difficulties encountered when attempting to facilitate sharing
geospatial information sharing while minimizing the associated operational risks.
Key Documents
•
•
•
•
•
•

RAND Report, “Mapping the Risks: Assessing the Homeland Security
Implications of Publicly Available Geospatial Information”. (Baker, 2004)
AFIT IMGT 669, “Vulnerability Investigation” (2004)
“Evolving Federal Protocols for Safeguarding Geospatial Information” (Cullis)
DoD Directive 8500.1, “Information Assurance (IA)”, 24 Oct 2002
DoD Directive 8100.1, “Global Information Grid (GIG) Overarching Policy”, 19
Sept 2002
GAO Report, “Information Sharing: The Federal Government Needs to Establish
Policies and Processes for Sharing Terrorism-Related and Sensitive but
Unclassified Information”, Mar 06
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•

GAO Report, “Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Needs
to be Strengthened”, Aug 2003

Research Enablers
This research is being sponsored by the following organizations:
AF/A7CI (Pentagon)
Information Resources Management Division, DCS/Installations,
Logistics & Mission Support
USAF GIS Support Center (USAFA)
US Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs
Field Procedures
Setting up the interview
Begin by an initial phone call or introduction email (basic format below) to establish
contact and explain the purpose of the interview. Follow up with a phone call and
additional email with additional information.
[Rank] [Name],
My name is Capt Scott Bryant. I am a student at the Air Force Institute of Technology conducting
thesis research regarding geospatial information security and information sharing. Specifically,
the goal of this research is to identify security and sharing issues regarding geospatial
information of the USAF GeoBase program and to improve the general understanding of
importance of balance between securing and sharing information in order to maximize USAF
mission processes and minimize customer inefficiencies.
I understand you are involved with this process and I would like to conduct an interview to gather
data for my research. Please contact me at scott.bryant@afit.edu if you are able to participate
and we can set up a time convenient for you.
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. I have also included my thesis
advisor’s contact information below:
Thesis Advisor: Dr. Michael Grimaila – Phone 937-255-3636 (DSN 785) x. 4800; Email michael.grimaila@afit.edu.
Thanks,
Scott A. Bryant, Capt, USAF
Student, Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT)
School of Engineering and Management (ENV)
scott.bryant@afit.edu
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Immediately prior to the interview:
1. Review pertinent information
2. Ensure to have the following information readily available:
a.
b.
c.
d.

Reference Folder
Any correspondence previously made with the interviewee
List of Questions / Question Answer Sheet
Laptop and notepad for recording answers

At the start of the interview:
1. Researcher Introduction: “My name is Capt Scott Bryant. I am a student at the
Air Force Institute of Technology conducting thesis research regarding geospatial
information security and information sharing within the US Air Force GeoBase
program.”
2. Ensure attendees are familiar with the intent and concepts of the research. Read
the purpose statement: “the goal of this research is to identify security and sharing
issues regarding geospatial information of the USAF GeoBase program and to
improve the general understanding of importance of balance between securing
and sharing information in order to maximize USAF mission processes and
minimize customer inefficiencies.”
3. Describe the interview process: “This will be a semi-structured interview. I have
a short list of questions, which may lead to additional questions for further
research or clarification purposes. Please feel free to interject any information
you feel may be useful to the research.”
4. Assure anonymity: “I want to remind you that no identifying information obtained
through this or subsequent interviews will be retained or reported in the final
thesis. In order to complete the research effort, data collected on individual
subjects may include duty title and description of/duration in current position,
which will facilitate analysis and follow up for the duration of this study only.
Data gathering will be focused on information specific to the USAF GeoBase
policies and procedures.”
5. Obtain permission for vocal recording (if applicable): “Vocal recording is a useful
tool to my research so that I may accurately capture the conversation, reducing the
chance for misinterpretation. Do I have your expressed permission to record this
interview?”
6. Record Interviewee information and interview start time on record sheet
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7. Ask the appropriate questions, depending on the interviewee
8. Provide interviewees ample time to fully articulate all comments. Wait for
appropriate pauses to seek clarification and for follow-up questions. Capitalizing
on the nature of the discussion, allow brainstorming of ideas. Tangential ideas can
be flushed out as the comments lull. (Oliver, 2004; Swanson et al, 2005.).
Following the interview:
1. Record interview stop time on record sheet
2. Consolidate all information into Case Study Database (see below)
3. Follow up with an email which should contain the following elements (see
template below):
a. Short message thanking the participant for their time
b. Request for any outstanding information necessary for completing the
report
c. Full contact information of researcher and thesis advisor
d. Assurance they will receive a copy of draft report when complete.
e. Reiteration of any information promised to the interviewee during the
interview
[Rank] [Name],
Thank you for participating in the [telephone] interview conducted on [date]. The
information you provided will certainly contribute to my research efforts.
As discussed, I would appreciate your assistance in obtaining the following documents:
[As applicable]
Also, as discussed, I owe you the following information/deliverables: [As applicable]
In addition, you will receive a copy of the draft thesis for your review prior to publishing.
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.
Thanks again,
Scott A. Bryant, Capt, USAF
Student, Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT)
School of Engineering and Management (ENV)
scott.bryant@afit.edu

4.

Once the instrument has been completed and all necessary clarification and
follow-up has been accomplished, type up the interview notes. Send each
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participant a copy of the notes and request a review. For the review, each
participant should add any additional comments and correct any errors in content
or context. Use of Track Changes in MS Word facilitates the investigators review
and allows copies to be saved for the “chain of evidence”. When the investigator
receives each reviewed copy, he should note any changes or additions. Edits
should be discussed, which may spur more discussion. A final opportunity to add
comments should also be given. (Oliver, 2004).
A Guide for the Study Report
The final case study report will be written in the approved Air Force Institute of
Technology thesis format.
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Appendix C: Thesis Research Overview (Sent to Interviewees)

AFIT
Air Force Institute of Technology

Geospatial Informational Security
risks and concerns of
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Abstract
Security Risks in USAF Geospatial Information Sharing
Scott A. Bryant,
Michael R. Grimaila (Advisor)
Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), Wright-Patterson AFB, OH
scott.bryant@afit.edu
michael.grimaila@afit.edu (937)255-3636 (DSN 785-3636) ext 4800

Technological advancements such as Geospatial Information Systems (GIS) and the Internet have made it easier
and affordable to share information, which enables complex and time sensitive decisions to be made with higher
confidence. Further, advancements in information technology have dramatically increased the ability to store,
manage, integrate, and correlate larger amounts of data to improve operational efficiency. However, the same
technologies that enable increased productivity also provide increased capabilities to those wishing to do harm.
Today's military leaders are faced with the challenge of deciding how to make geospatial information collected on
military installations and organizations available to authorized communities of interest while simultaneously
restricting access to protect operational security. Often, these decisions are made without understanding how the
sharing of certain combinations of data may pose a significant risk to protecting critical information, infrastructure or
resources. Information security has been an area of growing concern in the GeoBase community since, by
definition, it is required to strike a balance between competing interests, each supported by federal policy: (1) the
availability of data paid for by tax dollars and (2) the protection of data as required to mitigate risks.
In this paper, we explore the security implications of the US Air Force GeoBase (the US Air Force's applied
Geospatial Information System) program. We examine the rapid expansion of the use of GeoBase to communities
outside of the civil engineering field; examine the intrinsic and extrinsic security risks of the unconstrained sharing of
geospatial information; explore difficulties encountered when attempting to rate the sensitivity of information, discuss
new policies and procedures that have been implemented undertaken to protect the information, and propose
technical and managerial control measures to facilitate sharing geospatial information sharing while minimizing the
associated operational risks.
Keywords: Geospatial Information Security, USAF GeoBase, Terrorism, Targeting, Information Sharing
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Primary Research Goal
Improve the general understanding of
importance of balance between securing
and sharing information in order to
maximize USAF mission processes and
minimize customer inefficiencies.

(Sharing)
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4

Secondary Research Goals

14-Dec-06

1.

Improve systemic security design and
confidence in sharing information
across geospatial information systems
(GIS).

2.

Provide better understanding of what is
“appropriate access” to geospatial
information

3.

To strengthen future policies and
guidance to better safeguard
information while providing wider
benefits to the customer and the
mission.
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Targeted Research

GeoBase
Information
Security
Policies, Practices,
& Procedures
Risk
Management
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6

Type of Research
Case Study (Exploratory)
Exploratory Aspect

(GAO, 1990, pg 42)

14-Dec-06



When discussing “security”, so many
uncertainties exist. This research will also
explore questions and, where possible,
develop measurement constructs for
further research in this field.



Aimed at defining the questions and
hypotheses of a subsequent study or
determining the feasibility of the desired
research procedures (Yin, 2003, pg 5)



Goal may justifiably be to discover theory
by directly observing social phenomenon
in its raw form (Yin, 2003, pg 6)



Should be taken at face value (Yin, 2003, pg 7)



Problems may arise if investigator wrongly
uses data collected as part of an ensuing
case study (Yin, 2003, pg 7)
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Key Concepts
(for Literature Review)
USAF GeoBase
Geospatial Information Systems (GIS)
Information Security
Information Assurance
Information Sharing
Critical Information
Data-sharing policies
Data Stewardship
Risk Management
Security Measures
Sensitive / Critical data access controls
Data protection
Digital terrorism
Digital Rights Management
Information Life Cycle
Vulnerability Studies
Terrorism, Information Technology, and Vulnerability
Knowledge Management
National Map Efforts
Global Information Grid (GIG)
Freedom of Information Act
User Rights and Privledges
Internet Map Servers (IMS)
Data Integration (Security)
DoD Information Policies
Information Resource Management (IRM)
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Appendix D: Interview Outline
Disclaimer: The research associated with the interviews conducted during the site visits
is wholly academic in nature and not connected with any GeoBase reviews, initiatives, or
staff visits.
Research Background: The researcher is a captain in the AF and a graduate student in the
Information Resource Management (IRM) program at the AF Institute of Technology.
As part of the graduation requirements, the researcher must complete a thesis research
project. The topic chosen, in collaboration with the Headquarters Air Force Geo
Integration Office (HAF-GIO), concerns the relationship of IRM and GeoBase. The
primary objective of this research is to:
Improve the general understanding of importance of balance between
securing and sharing information in order to maximize USAF mission
processes and minimize customer inefficiencies.
This objective can be explored by identifying information security and sharing issues by
those with experience in the GeoBase program and relating them to recommended
information security and sharing practices found in the literature review.
Answers to the following questions should help provide greater insight that will enhance
the understanding of GeoBase and the securing and sharing of geospatial information.
Interview Questions:
SECTION 1: INTERVIEW INFO
1. Name:
2. Duty Title:
3. Are you involved with operating GeoBase servers?

SECTION 2: COMMAND BACKGROUND
1. What is your status on the completion of the Common Installation Picture (CIP)?
2. What Mission Data Sets (MDS) are you currently collecting / managing?
3. How far outside the installation boundary do you maintain as the extent of the Regional
Information Picture (RIP)?
a. What data is included in your version of the RIP?
b. What data is important and would like to include? (wish list)
c. What is the source(s) of your RIP data?
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SECTION 3: SECURITY
1. In your own words, what does “information security” mean to you in regards to the GeoBase
program?
2. How do you currently control access to your current GeoBase data/applications?
3. Do you consider “need to know” before granting access to GeoBase information?
a. How do you make that determination?
4. In your own experience, what is the biggest information security issue with regards to
GeoBase data and applications?
a. What steps are you currently taking to address this?
5. Do you or your office work with classified information?
a. How is classified information and unclassified information separated?
b. What are the expected security benefits of restricting access to the information?
6. What are the expected costs of restricting access to the information to either you or your
customers?
7. What factors are considered for deciding the sensitivity of information?
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS
1. Do you have a copy of your local security policy?
2. Are all AF GIS databases documented e.g. command has a central listing)?
3. What contractor hiring practices are employed to ensure security?
4. What type of security awareness training do users receive relating to geospatial information?
a. May I have a copy?
5. Who are your customers and how often do they use the GIS web server?
6. How do you identify the responsibilities of organizations that receive or add value to data, or
of intermediaries such as contractors or host nations?
7. How are data restrictions enforced on these "downstream" users?
8. Is there a systematic review of policies (e.g. inspections)?
a. If so, how often is the program reviewed and by who?
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LOGICAL / TECHNICAL CONTROLS
1. What methods are used to identify users who request access to restricted information?
2. How do you permit authorized users to access restricted information?
3. How do users access non-restricted information?
4. Do you log all accesses to the database?
a. Do you review the logs for any purposes?
5. How is change management handled (e.g. modifications to the database)?
PHYSICAL CONTROLS
1. Where do your servers reside?
a. Who maintains your servers?
2. Do you have a copy of your disaster recovery plan?
3. How do you recover from a catastrophic system failure? (Physical security - backup plans)
4. How do you recover from a partial system failure? (Physical security - backup plans)
5. Are there any screening measures in place to detect questionable data in the database?
SECTION 4: INFORMATION SHARING
1. Who do you share your information with? (Who depends on your information?)
2. Who do you depend on information from?
3. Have you encountered problems relating to information sharing?
a. If yes, what kind of problems?
b. How are you overcoming these problems?
4. How do you determine what information is acceptable for sharing?
5. When you share information, is anything expected in return?
6. What type (how many) designations of sensitive information can be applied to GeoBase
information?

Is there anything else that you would like to add, which you feel is important to this
subject?
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Appendix E: Relative Laws & Executive Orders (1950 to Present)

LAW
The Federal Records Act

PURPOSE - DESCRIPTION
“The Federal Records Act of 1950, as amended, establishes the framework for
records management programs in Federal Agencies. As the primary agency
for records management oversight, the National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA) is responsible for assisting Federal agencies in
maintaining adequate and proper documentation of policies and transactions
of the Federal Government. This is done by appraising records (determining
record value and final disposition of temporary or permanent records),
regulating and approving the disposition of Federal records, operating Federal
Records Centers and preserving permanent records.

YEAR
1950

Federal records may not be destroyed-except in accordance with the
procedures described in Chapter 33 of Title 44, United States Code. These
procedures allow for records destruction only under the authority of a records
disposition schedule approved by the Archivist of the United States. NARA
issues a General Records Schedule (GRS) that gives record descriptions of
records that are common to most Federal agencies and authorizes record
disposals for temporary records. The Department is responsible for
developing agency record schedules-with the approval of the Archivist of the
United States-that are tailored to our own agency-specific records that are
not provided for in the GRS.
Record schedules are mandatory instructions of what to do with records (and
nonrecord materials) no longer needed for current Government business. The
records schedules indicate how long a document must be kept before it is
transferred to a Federal Records Center, destroyed or transferred to NARA for
permanent preservation.
The Department's Records Management Program is responsible for ensuring
that the legal, financial, evidentiary and historical transactions are recorded
accurately and completely. We must document and preserve the historical
and nationally important events that have taken place as a result of the
Department's educational leadership and support.
As the Department transitions from paper to e-government, we must capture
and protect all forms of documentation in accordance with Federal laws and
regulations relating to records management. We must provide and implement
safeguards against the unlawful removal or loss of the Department's
information. This is accomplished by using the GRS and the agency's NARAapproved records disposition schedules for records unique to this agency.
Such a schedule ensure the systematic disposal of inactive records and the
transfer of permanent records to the National Archives for permanent
retention.”
(http://www.ed.gov/policy/gen/leg/fra.html)

The Privacy Act

“The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000), which has been in effect
since September 27, 1975, can generally be characterized as an omnibus
"code of fair information practices" that attempts to regulate the collection,
maintenance, use, and dissemination of personal information by federal
executive branch agencies. However, the Act's imprecise language, limited
legislative history, and somewhat outdated regulatory guidelines have
rendered it a difficult statute to decipher and apply. Moreover, even after
more than twenty-five years of administrative and judicial analysis, numerous
Privacy Act issues remain unresolved or unexplored. Adding to these
interpretational difficulties is the fact that many Privacy Act cases are
unpublished district court decisions. A particular effort is made in this
"Overview" to clarify the existing state of Privacy Act law while at the same
time highlighting those controversial, unsettled areas where further litigation
and case law development can be expected.”
http://www.usdoj.gov/foia/04_7_1.html
http://www.usdoj.gov/foia/privstat.htm
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Executive Order 12356
(National Security
Information)

“This Order prescribes a uniform system for classifying, declassifying, and
safeguarding national security information. It recognizes that it is essential
that the public be informed concerning the activities of its Government, but
that the interests of the United States and its citizens require that certain
information concerning the national defense and foreign relations be
protected against unauthorized disclosure. Information may not be classified
under this Order unless its disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause
damage to the national security.”

1982

(http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executiveorder/12356.html)

Computer Security Act of 1987

”Following OMB A-130, The Computer Security Act of 1987 developed
standards and guidelines to assure [40 USC 0759]:
•
•
•
•
•

1987

Cost-effective security
Privacy of sensitive information
Standards and guidelines are followed
Security plans are developed
Mandatory periodic training is conducted

The Computer Security Act also provided a provision to allow agencies to
waive mandatory FIPS. This waiver provision, in effect, significantly
dampened the effectiveness of FIPS.”
(DIACAP, 2005)
(http://www.cio.gov/archive/computer_security_act_jan_1998.html)

The Stafford Act

“The Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act)
(Public Law 100-707) is a United States federal law designed to bring an
orderly and systemic means of federal natural disaster assistance for state
and local governments in carrying out their responsibilities to aid citizens.

1988

The Stafford Act is a 1988 amended version of the Disaster Relief Act of 1974
(Public Law 93-288). It created the system in place today by which a
Presidential Disaster Declaration of an emergency triggers financial and
physical assistance through the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA).
The Act gives FEMA the responsibility for coordinating government wide relief
efforts. The Federal Response Plan it implements includes the contributions of
28 federal agencies and non governmental organizations, such as the
American Red Cross. In October 2000, Congress amended it again by passing
the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-390).”
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stafford_Disaster_Relief_and_Emergency_Assist
ance_Act)

The Government Performance
and Results Act of 1993

“To provide for the establishment of strategic planning and performance
measurement in the Federal Government, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled,
Purposes.-The purposes of this Act are to(1) improve the confidence of the American people in the capability of the
Federal Government, by systematically holding Federal agencies
accountable for achieving program results;
(2) initiate program performance reform with a series of pilot projects in
setting program goals, measuring program performance against those
goals, and reporting publicly on their progress;
(3) improve Federal program effectiveness and public accountability by
promoting a new focus on results, service quality, and customer
satisfaction;
(4) help Federal managers improve service delivery, by requiring that they
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plan for meeting program objectives and by providing them with
information about program results and service quality;
(5) improve congressional decisionmaking by providing more objective
information on achieving statutory objectives, and on the relative
effectiveness and efficiency of Federal programs and spending; and
(6) improve internal management of the Federal Government.”
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/mgmt-gpra/gplaw2m.html#h2)

Executive Order 12829

“Ex. Ord. No. 12829, Jan. 6, 1993, 58 F.R. 3479, as amended by Ex. Ord. No.
12885, Dec. 14, 1993, 58 F.R. 65863, provided: This order establishes a
National Industrial Security Program to safeguard Federal Government
classified information that is released to contractors, licensees, and grantees
of the United States Government. To promote our national interests, the
United States Government issues contracts, licenses, and grants to
nongovernment organizations. When these arrangements require access to
classified information, the national security requires that this information be
safeguarded in a manner equivalent to its protection within the executive
branch of Government. The national security also requires that our industrial
security program promote the economic and technological interests of the
United States. Redundant, overlapping, or unnecessary requirements impede
those interests. Therefore, the National Industrial Security Program shall
serve as a single, integrated, cohesive industrial security program to protect
classified information and to preserve our Nation's economic and technological
interests.”

1993

(DIACAP, 2005)
(http://www.archives.gov/isoo/policy-documents/eo-12829.html)

Executive Order 12906
(Coordinating Geographic
Data Acquisition and Access:
The National Spatial Data
Infrastructure)

“Geographic information is critical to promote economic development,
improve our stewardship of natural resources, and protect the environment.
Modern technology now permits improved acquisition, distribution, and
utilization of geographic (or geospatial) data and mapping. The National
Performance Review has recommended that the executive branch develop, in
cooperation with State, local, and tribal governments, and the private sector,
a coordinated National Spatial Data Infrastructure to support public and
private sector applications of geospatial data in such areas as transportation,
community development, agriculture, emergency response, environmental
management, and information technology.”

1994

(http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo12906.htm)

The Paperwork Reduction Act

“The purposes of this subchapter are to—
(1) minimize the paperwork burden for individuals, small businesses,
educational and nonprofit institutions, Federal contractors, State, local
and tribal governments, and other persons resulting from the collection
of information by or for the Federal Government;
(2) ensure the greatest possible public benefit from and maximize the utility
of information created, collected, maintained, used, shared and
disseminated by or for the Federal Government;
(3) coordinate, integrate, and to the extent practicable and appropriate, make
uniform Federal information resources management policies and
practices as a means to improve the productivity, efficiency, and
effectiveness of Government programs, including the reduction of
information collection burdens on the public and the improvement of
service delivery to the public;
(4) improve the quality and use of Federal information to strengthen
decisionmaking, accountability, and openness in Government and
society;
(5) minimize the cost to the Federal Government of the creation, collection,
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maintenance, use, dissemination, and disposition of information;
(6) strengthen the partnership between the Federal Government and State,
local, and tribal governments by minimizing the burden and maximizing
the utility of information created, collected, maintained, used,
disseminated, and retained by or for the Federal Government;
(7) provide for the dissemination of public information on a timely basis, on
equitable terms, and in a manner that promotes the utility of the
information to the public and makes effective use of information
technology;
(8) ensure that the creation, collection, maintenance, use, dissemination, and
disposition of information by or for the Federal Government is consistent
with applicable laws, including laws relating to—
(A) privacy and confidentiality, including section 552a of title 5;
(B) security of information, including the Computer Security Act of 1987
(Public Law 100-235); and
(C) access to information, including section 552 of title 5;
(9) ensure the integrity, quality, and utility of the Federal statistical system;
(10) ensure that information technology is acquired, used, and managed to
improve performance of agency missions, including the reduction of
information collection burdens on the public; and
(11) improve the responsibility and accountability of the Office of
Management and Budget and all other Federal agencies to Congress and
to the public for implementing the information collection review process,
information resources management, and related policies and guidelines
established under this subchapter.”
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/laws/paperwork-reduction/

Executive Order 12951
(Release of Imagery Acquired
by Space-Based National
Intelligence Reconnaissance
Systems)

This order prescribes a comprehensive and exclusive system for the public
release of imagery acquired by space-based national intelligence
reconnaissance systems. This order is the exclusive Executive order
governing the public release of imagery for purposes of section 52(b)(1) of
the Freedom of Information Act.
Provides release for certain scientifically or environmentally useful imagery
acquired by space-based national intelligence reconnaissance systems,
consistent with the national security, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. Public Release of Historical Intelligence
Imagery. Imagery acquired by the space-based national
intelligence reconnaissance systems known as the Corona, Argon,
and Lanyard missions shall, within 18 months of the date of this
order, be declassified and transferred to the National Archives
and Records Administration with a copy sent to the United States
Geological Survey of the Department of the Interior consistent
with procedures approved by the Director of Central Intelligence
and the Archivist of the United States. Upon transfer, such
imagery shall be deemed declassified and shall be made available
to the public.
Section 2. Review for Future Public Release of Intelligence
Imagery. (a) All information that meets the criteria in
section 2(b) of this order shall be kept secret in the interests
of national defense and foreign policy until deemed otherwise
by the Director of Central Intelligence. In consultation with the
Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of Central
Intelligence shall establish a comprehensive program for the
periodic review of imagery from systems other than the Corona,
Argon, and Lanyard missions, with the objective of making
available to the public as much imagery as possible consistent
with the interests of national defense and foreign policy.
For imagery from obsolete broad-area film-return systems other
than Corona, Argon, and Lanyard missions, this review shall
be completed within 5 years of the date of this order. Review of
imagery from any other system that the Director of Central
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Intelligence deems to be obsolete shall be accomplished according
to a timetable established by the Director of Central
Intelligence. The Director of Central Intelligence shall report
annually to the President on the implementation of this order.
(http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo12951.htm)

The National Technology
Transfer and Advancement Act
of 1995

“United States Public Law 104-113, was signed into law March 7, 1995. The
Act amended several existing acts and mandated new directions for federal
agencies with the purpose of:

•

bringing technology and industrial innovation to market more
quickly

•

encouraging cooperative research and development between
business and the Federal government by providing access to federal
laboratories

•

1995

making it easier for businesses to obtain exclusive licenses to
technology and inventions that result from cooperative research
with the Federal government
The Act made a direct impact on the development of new industrial and
technology standards by requiring that all Federal agencies use privately
developed standards, particularly those developed by standards developing
organizations.”
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Technology_Transfer_and_Advanceme
nt_Act)

The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996

Clinger-Cohen Act (CCA) of 1996 provides that the government information
technology shop be operated exactly as an efficient and profitable business
would be operated. Acquisition, planning and management of technology
must be treated as a "capital investment." While the law is complex, all
consumers of hardware and software in the Department should be aware of
the Chief Information Officer's leadership in implementing this statute.

1996

CCA emphasizes an integrated framework of technology aimed at efficiently
performing the business of the Department. Just as few businesses can turn a
profit by allowing their employees to purchase anything they want to do any
project they want, the Department also cannot operate efficiently with
hardware and software systems purchased on an "impulse purchase" basis
and installed without an overall plan. All facets of capital planning are taken
into consideration just as they would be in private industry:

•
•
•

cost/benefit ratio
expected life of the technology
flexibility and possibilities for multiple uses

(http://www.ed.gov/policy/gen/leg/cca.html)

The Freedom of Information
Act and the Electronic
Freedom of Information Act
Amendments of 1996

The Freedom of Information Act (1) generally provides that any person has a
right, enforceable in court, to obtain access to federal agency records, except
to the extent that such records (or portions of them) are protected from
public disclosure by one of nine exemptions or by one of three special law
enforcement record exclusions.
Enacted in 1966, and taking effect on July 4, 1967, the FOIA firmly
established an effective statutory right of public access to executive branch
information in the federal government. The principles of government
openness and accountability underlying the FOIA, however, are inherent in
the democratic ideal: "The basic purpose of [the] FOIA is to ensure an
informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to
check against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the
governed." (2) The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that only
"[o]fficial information that sheds light on an agency's performance of its
statutory duties falls squarely within that statutory purpose."
(http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/introduc.htm)
http://www.usdoj.gov/04foia/04_7.html

137

1996

Rehabilitation Act, Sec. 508,
Electronic and Information
Technology

“Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act to require Federal agencies to
make their electronic and information technology accessible to people with
disabilities. Inaccessible technology interferes with an individual's ability to
obtain and use information quickly and easily. Section 508 was enacted to
eliminate barriers in information technology, to make available new
opportunities for people with disabilities, and to encourage development of
technologies that will help achieve these goals. The law applies to all Federal
agencies when they develop, procure, maintain, or use electronic and
information technology. Under Section 508 (29 U.S.C. ‘ 794d), agencies must
give disabled employees and members of the public access to information
that is comparable to the access available to others.”

1998

(http://www.section508.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=Content&ID=3)

The Government Paperwork
Elimination Act of 1999

“The Government Paperwork Elimination Act (GPEA, Pub. L. 105-277)
requires that, when practicable, Federal agencies use electronic forms,
electronic filing, and electronic signatures to conduct official business with the
public by 2003. In doing this, agencies will create records with business, legal
and, in some cases, historical value. This guidance focuses on records
management issues involving records that have been created using electronic
signature technology. It supplements the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) guidance for agencies implementing the GPEA, as well as other
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) guidance.

1999

This guidance discusses the records management principles that apply to
electronic signature technology generally. Electronic signatures may be
accomplished by several different technologies, such as Personal Identification
Number (PIN), digital signatures, smart cards and biometrics. If additional
technology-specific records management guidance is necessary, NARA will
work with agencies to develop it.”
http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/policy/electronic-signaturetechnology.html

USA PATRIOT Act

“H.R.3162: Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001
(Enrolled as Agreed to or Passed by Both House and Senate)

2001

“An Act to deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the
world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and for other
purposes.”
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c107:H.R.3162.ENR:

Government Act of 2002

“Today I have signed into law H.R. 2458, the "E-Government Act of 2002."
This legislation builds upon my Administration's expanding E-Government
initiative by ensuring strong leadership of the information technology
activities of Federal agencies, a comprehensive framework for information
security standards and programs, and uniform safeguards to protect the
confidentiality of information provided by the public for statistical purposes.
The Act will also assist in expanding the use of the Internet and computer
resources in order to deliver Government services, consistent with the reform
principles I outlined on July 10, 2002, for a citizen-centered, results-oriented,
and market-based Government.
Title II of this Act authorizes agencies to award "share-in-savings" contracts
under which contractors share in the savings achieved by agencies through
the provision of technologies that improve or accelerate their work. The
executive branch shall ensure, consistent with applicable law, that these
contracts are operated according to sound fiscal policy and limit authorized
waivers for funding of potential termination costs to appropriate
circumstances, so as to minimize the financial risk to the Government.
Title III of this Act is the Federal Information Security Management Act of
2002. It is very similar to title X of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which
also bears the name Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002
and which I signed into law on November 25, 2002. I am signing into law the
E-Government Act after the enactment of the Homeland Security Act, and
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there is no indication that the Congress intended the E-Government Act to
provide interim provisions that would apply only until the Homeland Security
Act took effect. Thus, notwithstanding the delayed effective dates applicable
to the Homeland Security Act, the executive branch will construe the EGovernment Act as permanently superseding the Homeland Security Act in
those instances where both Acts prescribe different amendments to the same
provisions of the United States Code.
Finally, the executive branch shall construe and implement the Act in a
manner consistent with the President's constitutional authorities to supervise
the unitary executive branch and to protect sensitive national security, law
enforcement, and foreign relations information. In particular, consistent with
my constitutional authorities and section 301(c) of this Act, the executive
branch shall construe the Act in a manner that preserves the authorities of
the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and other
agency heads with regard to the operation, control, and management of
national security systems.
GEORGE W. BUSH
THE WHITE HOUSE,
December 17, 2002”
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/20021217-5.html)
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/egov/index.html)

Federal Information Security
Management Act of 2002 (Sec
3541 of title 44, US Code)

“The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 ("FISMA",
44 U.S.C. § 3541, et seq.) is a United States federal law enacted in 2002 as
Title III of the E-Government Act of 2002 (Pub.L. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899).
The Act was meant to bolster computer and network security within the
Federal Government and affiliated parties (such as government contractors)
by mandating yearly audits.
FISMA has brought attention to cybersecurity within the Federal Government,
which had previously been much neglected. As of February 2005, many
government agencies received extremely poor marks on the official report
card, with an average of 67.3% for 2004, an improvement of only 2.3
percentage points over 2003.[1] This shows a marginal increase in how federal
agencies prioritize cybersecurity, but experts warn that this average must
increase for the Government to truly protect itself.”

2002

(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Information_Security_Management_Act
_of_2002)

OMB Circular A-130 (on
Management of Federal
Information Resources)

“This Circular establishes policy for the management of Federal information
resources. OMB includes procedural and analytic guidelines for implementing
specific aspects of these policies as appendices.”

2002

(http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a016/a016_rev.html)

Homeland Security Act (HSA)

“This section establishes the Department of Homeland Security in the
executive branch of the United States government and defines its primary
missions and responsibilities. The primary missions of the department include
preventing terrorist attacks within the United States, reducing the
vulnerability of the United States to terrorism at home, and minimizing the
damage and assisting in the recovery from any attacks that may occur. The
Department’s primary responsibilities correspond to the five major functions
established by the bill within the Department: information analysis and
infrastructure protection; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and
related countermeasures; border and transportation security; emergency
preparedness and response; and coordination with other parts of the federal
government, with state and local governments, and with the private sector.
These primary missions and responsibilities are not exhaustive, and the
Department will continue to carry out other functions of the agencies it will
absorb.”

2002

(http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland/bill/)

Executive Order 13356
(Strengthening the Sharing of
Terrorism Information to

“in order to further strengthen the effective conduct of United States
intelligence activities and protect the territory, people, and interests of the
United States of America, including against terrorist attacks, it is hereby

139

2004

Protect Americans)

ordered as follows:
Section 1. Policy. To the maximum extent consistent with applicable law,
agencies shall, in the design and use of information systems and in the
dissemination of information among agencies:
(a) give the highest priority to (i) the detection, prevention, disruption,
preemption, and mitigation of the effects of terrorist activities against the
territory, people, and interests of the United States of America, (ii) the
interchange of terrorism information among agencies, (iii) the interchange of
terrorism information between agencies and appropriate authorities of States
and local governments, and (iv) the protection of the ability of agencies to
acquire additional such information; and
(b) protect the freedom, information privacy, and other legal rights of
Americans in the conduct of activities implementing subsection (a).”
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040827-4.html)

Executive Order 13388
(Strengthening the Sharing of
Terrorism Information to
Protect Americans)

Revokes Executive Order 13356 and

2005

Section 1. Policy. (same as 13356)
Sec. 2. Duties of Heads of Agencies Possessing or Acquiring Terrorism
Information.
Sec. 3. Preparing Terrorism Information for Maximum Distribution.
Sec. 4. Requirements for Collection of Terrorism Information Inside the United
States.
Sec. 5. Establishment and Functions of Information Sharing Council.
(http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-13388.htm)
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051025-5.html)

USA PATRIOT Improvement
And Reauthorization Act Of
2005

This new legislation “allows intelligence and law enforcement officials to
continue sharing information and using the same tools against terrorists
already employed against drug dealers and other criminals. While
safeguarding Americans' civil liberties, this legislation also strengthens the
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) so that it can better detect and disrupt
terrorist threats, and it also gives law enforcement new tools to combat
threats. America still faces dangerous enemies, and no priority is more
important to the President than protecting the American people without
delay.”

2006

(http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060309-4.html)

Executive Order 13407
(Public Alert and Warning
System)

“By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws
of the United States of America, including the Robert T. Stafford Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.),
and the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.), it
is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. Policy. It is the policy of the United States to have an effective,
reliable, integrated, flexible, and comprehensive system to alert and warn the
American people in situations of war, terrorist attack, natural disaster, or
other hazards to public safety and well-being (public alert and warning
system), taking appropriate account of the functions, capabilities, and needs
of the private sector and of all levels of government in our Federal system,
and to ensure that under all conditions the President can communicate with
the American people.”
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/20060626.html)
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(June)

Appendix F: Relative Policies and Guidance

Interim Department of Defense (DoD) Information Assurance (IA) Certification and
Accreditation (C&A) Process Guidance (DIACAP)

6 Jul 2006

Guidance for Implementing Net-Centric Data Sharing (DoD 8320.02-G)

12 Apr 2006

Interim AMC GeoBase Information Security Policy

15 Sep 2005

USAF Installation Geospatial Information Security Policy

Installations and Logistics (IL) Data Access Policy

AMC GeoBase Data Replication Policy

DRAFT

7 Feb 2005

Oct 2004

Air Force Information and Data Management Strategy Policy

3 Mar 2004

DoD Directive 8500.1: Information Assurance (IA)

24 Oct 2002

USAF GeoBase Policy Memo

DoD Directive 8100.1: Global Information Grid (GIG) Overarching Policy

FGDC Policy on Access to Public Information and the Protection of Personal
Information Privacy in Federal Geospatial Databases

DoD Instruction 5200.40: DoD Information Technology Security Certification and
Accreditation Process (DITSCAP) – CANCELED, See DIACAP
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7 Oct 2002

19 Sep 2002

Apr 1998

30 Dec 1997
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